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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Incentive/disincentive clauses (I/D) help to accelerate highway construction by awarding 
payments if work is completed ahead of schedule and deducting payments if the completion time 
is exceeded. Even though there have been many recent studies on this topic, including NCHRP 
652, the one important question still left unanswered is, “Did the costs of the actual work zone 
impacts that were avoided justify the incentives paid?” All I/D projects in Missouri from 2008 to 
2011 were examined and the results show that I/D was highly effective in mitigating work zone 
impacts. Twenty I/D projects were examined in detail. Work zone impacts in terms of road user 
costs (RUC) were computed separately for three categories: traveler delay costs, vehicle 
operating costs and safety/crash costs. For both partial and full closure work zones, the impacts 
of detours were analyzed. Traveler delays were computed using well-known Highway Capacity 
Manual (HCM) analysis. Delays were valued separately for passenger cars and commercial 
trucks. The vehicle operating costs includes items such as fuel and wear and tear of vehicles. The 
safety costs were calculated using Highway Safety Manual (HSM) analysis. HSM methodology 
involved the prediction of crash frequencies using safety performance functions and crash 
modification factors reflecting length and duration of work zones.      
Table A shows summary statistics for I/D project in Missouri. Out of a possible 278 incentive 
days, 214 days were reduced through incentives. The RUC savings from those 214 days 
amounted to approximately $8.9 million. The net RUC savings produced was around $7.2 
million after subtracting the approximately $1.7 million paid in incentives. In other words, for 
every dollar paid in incentives, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC savings resulted. On average, 
the RUC saved was $444,389 of $3,464,620 or around 13% of the average contract amount. The 
average and median incentive rates were $7655 per day and $4357 per day, respectively. The 
average I/D rate was set at 16.7% of the daily RUC. None of the 20 I/D projects resulted in 
disincentives being assessed. This asymmetry in incentives being awarded much more then 
disincentives being assessed is also found in the experiences of other states.   
Table A I/D Project Summary, 2008-2011  
No. 
Max 
Poss. 
Inc. Days 
Days 
Saved 
Daily RUC RUC Savings 
Incentive 
Paid 
Net RUC 
Savings 
Total 278 214 
N/A 
$8,887,783 $1,684,000 $7,203,783 
Target (day 
of max 
incentive) 
278 278 $11,493,358 $2,351,680 $9,141,678 
Percent 100 64 77% 72% 79% 
Average 14 11 $48,799 $444,389 $84,200 $360,189 
Median 9 7 $31,008 $140,123 $30,500 $69,816 
 
The I/D projects were cross-tabulated into the categories of full-closure, urban, rural and 
emergency projects. In terms of net RUC savings, the most effective were emergency projects 
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(93%) followed closely by full closures (86%) and urban projects (80%). Rural, non-emergency 
projects produced the smallest net percentage of RUC savings at 33%. But even in rural, non-
emergency projects, the RUC savings exceeded the incentives paid. This rural result is due to the 
small amount of traffic in rural areas and a larger incentive amount with respect to RUC. The 
percentages of I/D as a proportion of RUC were 36.4% for rural, non-emergency; 24.1% for 
urban, 12.1% for full closure; and 8.0% for emergency projects.     
In addition to the analysis of individual projects, a programmatic comparison between I/D 
projects and all MoDOT projects was conducted. One measure of performance is the percentage 
deviation of the final cost from the programmed cost. On average, I/D project deviated more at -
11.82% as compared to other projects at -7.30%. A related measure is the percentage difference 
between the original award and the total construction payouts. For I/D projects, this difference 
ranged between 0.3% and 6.5% annually, while overall projects ranged between 0.4% and 1.9% 
annually. It appears that I/D projects are programmed more conservatively, and they are subject 
to a greater percentage change from the original award. In terms on-time performance, I/D 
projects performed better than other projects. On an annual basis, 83% to 100% of I/D projects 
were completed on-time compared to 67% to 79% for all projects. For I/D projects, the average 
number of bids per call is actually higher than other projects. Thus the demands of project 
acceleration do not reduce competition in the current economic climate.  
Twenty-eight DOT responses and twenty-one contractor responses were received for surveys on 
I/D experience. In general, the survey responses from DOT and contractors were very similar. 
The survey results indicate that I/D provision are used by almost all DOTs with a few 
incorporating I/D contracting into their standard procedures. DOT and contractors both 
responded that the top issues in a successful I/D project are well-defined project scope, timely 
problem resolution, communications with the contractor and preconstruction planning. A flexible 
start date is the least important. The DOT indicate that the two most influential project 
characteristics for motivating the use of I/D are high traffic volume facilities and the potential for 
severe traffic disruptions. Most DOT do not require a specific project characteristic for I/D to be 
used. How I/D rates are set varies significantly among the DOT. The quantitative amount ranges 
between 10% and 100% of the RUC. DOT and contractors agree that a poorly defined project 
scope, plans and specification errors and utility conflicts are significant challenges to using I/D. 
Neither group believes that worker morale is a significant challenge to I/D. As is evidenced by 
actual project data, the surveys also agreed that I/D provisions do effectively motivate 
construction acceleration. Despite the general similarities between DOT and contractor 
responses, one exception is the question on the possibility of increasing the number of incentive 
days. It appears that contractors are more confident in their ability to further accelerate projects. 
The bid amounts on I/D projects do not appear to be higher or lower than other projects. 
The use of incentive/disincentive clauses in transportation is heavily influenced by §635.127 of 
Title 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The intended effect of this regulation is to facilitate 
the inclusion of road user costs (RUC) to accelerate projects. However, one possible unintended 
consequence is for disincentives to be construed as unenforceable penalties as illustrated in 
Milton. This report argues for an alternate approach to disincentives where liquidated damages 
include all reasonable foreseeable damages including RUC. The reasons for this approach are to 
prevent RUC from being construed as impermissible security for performance, to avoid double 
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counting RUC, and to reflect the asymmetry in the legal principles justifying disincentives as 
opposed to incentives. This approach lets the liquidated damages amount speak for itself: on high 
traffic impact projects, the RUC amounts will naturally be high and on low traffic impact 
projects the RUC amounts will be negligible. In addition to the aforementioned legal issues, 
DOT often need to consider other issues such as public perception of incentives.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As cities and urban highways become more congested each year, the timely or accelerated 
completion of transportation projects gains greater importance in contracting. A summary of 
several studies indicates that approximately 50% of all highway congestion is non-recurring due 
to work zones, incidents, weather and special events (Chin et al. 2002). Approximately 83% of 
congestion occurs on urban freeways and 15% on rural freeways. Thus departments of 
transportations (DOT), being owners of such facilities, face increasing pressure to minimize 
work zone impacts. Several contracting procedures seek to reduce traffic impacts by reducing the 
time traffic is exposed to work zones through the use of incentive/disincentive (I/D) contract 
provisions (AASHTO 2001). The Code of Federal Regulations (2012) defines an 
incentive/disincentive for early completion as “a contract provision which compensates the 
contractor a certain amount of money for each day identified critical work is completed ahead of 
schedule and assesses a deduction for each day the contractor overruns the incentive/disincentive 
time.” However, there has been little effort on the DOT to investigate the effectiveness of such 
contract provisions for mitigating work zone impacts. 
The motivation behind the decision to use I/D contracts is to reduce the construction schedule on 
projects that cause significant work zone traffic impacts. The level of impact is measured by road 
user costs (RUC), namely the increase in RUC due to a highway construction project. As such, 
I/D contracts are typically reserved for projects with high RUC impacts and the incentive and 
disincentive amounts are calculated based on this increased RUC (FHWA, 1989). RUC, for the 
purpose of setting I/D amounts, are determined by costs associated with the increased delay and 
safety risks that drivers experience within work zones and/or the additional costs of using a 
detour route. In cases where the work requires a detour, the RUC is based on the additional time 
and distance driven on the detour route. This additional travel distance not only causes delays but 
also an increase in vehicle operating costs and the probability for crashes. 
An additional consideration when using a schedule-based incentive contract is the contractor’s 
increased cost due to the acceleration of construction. These costs are difficult to accurately 
estimate because every contractor has different capabilities for acceleration. When setting I/D 
rates, the amount must be higher than the acceleration costs for the contractor or there will be no 
reduction in the schedule or impacts to the public. The reduction in construction time from a 
successfully executed I/D contract will benefit both the contractor and the traveling public at a 
minimal cost to the DOT.  
This research aims to answers the question, “Did the costs of the actual impacts that were 
avoided justify the incentives paid or did the costs that were incurred justify the disincentives 
that were assessed?” It is not enough to say that since the I/D rate was set lower than the RUC 
then the I/D will benefit the public favorably. There is a tradeoff between ratio of the I/D rate to 
the RUC and the amount of schedule compression. If the I/D rate to RUC ratio is conservative, 
i.e. the I/D rate is set relatively low, then the contractor may not be motivated to reduce the 
schedule. On the other hand, if the ratio is set too generously, i.e. the I/D rate is set relatively 
high, the public will benefit less favorably from the compressed schedule. The optimal ratio of 
I/D rate to RUC exists somewhere in-between the extremes, but there is currently no widely 
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acceptable way to determine this optimal ratio. To examine how current practices of I/D 
contracts are performing in these regards, highway construction projects with I/D provisions 
from the state of Missouri were evaluated.  
1.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
To validate the motivations for using an accelerating contracting technique like I/D, projects 
were evaluated to determine the amount of RUC actually avoided.  When deciding to use an I/D 
contract, DOT officials are motivated by the potential benefits to road users versus how much it 
will cost to achieve an accelerated schedule. These benefits to road users involve a reduction in 
the work zone traffic impacts including delay time, vehicle operating costs, and safety. The net 
benefit will be the difference in avoided RUC and the incentives paid. Aside from the direct 
costs of paying contractor incentives, there are other potential effects for which the costs are not 
easily determined. Previous studies have indicated potential issues to be higher bid amounts, 
difficulty with staying within budget, and overestimated contract times resulting in unnecessary 
incentive payments (Gillespie 1998). Nearly every highway construction project causes some 
amount of increased RUC. Although some research has suggested that all projects should have 
some form of I/D to account for the RUC (Bajari and Lewis 2009), FHWA (1989) advises  to 
reserve I/D provisions for projects with significant impacts on RUC. Therefore, projects that are 
appropriate for I/D use will have RUC that are significantly higher than the amount needed to 
motivate the contractor to accelerate construction. In other words, a successful I/D contract will 
achieve an accelerated schedule by paying an incentive that is justifiably lower than the RUC. 
The best way to determine if I/D provisions are effective is to evaluate completed I/D contracts. 
If schedule reductions were achieved and considerable net RUC savings were realized, then the 
incentive was justified. The first part of this study evaluated 20 MoDOT I/D contracts and 
determined if the RUC savings justified the incentives paid. 
To seek out potential issues with I/D contracts, the second part of this study compared the 
performance of various administrative issues of I/D contracts to the average contract let by 
MoDOT. Contract administration could be affected by the inclusion of an I/D provision into a 
contract.  As part of MoDOT’s ongoing report on its performance, the quarterly Tracker 
document, it keeps a record of contract performance. The specific performance measures that 
were used were completion time performance, percent change in the contract amount after 
construction, number of bids per contract, and contract budget. If I/D contracts are performing as 
expected then I/D contracts should be completed earlier than average. The percentage change in 
the contract amount was evaluated because a large change can quickly erode the effectiveness of 
I/D contracts (Fick et al. 2010). A high number of bids indicates a competitive market, which can 
benefit the DOT with possible lower award amounts (Fick et al. 2010). Finally, since the amount 
of incentives paid or disincentives received is not known until contract completion, budgeting for 
I/D contracts is challenging. This study will use these measures to evaluate how I/D contracts 
performed with respect to the typical contract. 
I/D contracts have other variables that affect the success of accelerating construction. Issues 
involving planning, communication, and project development were explored. A survey of DOT 
and contractors was used to determine what issues are the most important to each party. This 
survey supplements the other findings in this study with qualitative measures. 
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1.2. CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE OF THE ART 
This research began with a literature review of previous evaluations of I/D contracts. These 
evaluations can be categorized into quantitative project analysis, case studies and survey-based 
analysis. The quantitative analysis involved the examination of quantitative performance 
measures. It was found that there has been no systematic analysis of I/D projects for 
investigating work zone traffic safety and mobility impacts in previous studies. Some 
quantitative analyses performed have involved small sample sizes of four to six projects. Most of 
these studies have emphasized project management issues and not work zone impacts. Case 
studies involved the examination of a specific project. Even though these individual studies were 
detailed, the studies differed greatly with each other, thus no useful comparisons could be made. 
The survey-based analysis involved the examination of general perspectives and attitudes 
towards I/D. The surveys lacked quantifiable information about the impacts of I/D contracts on 
work zone traffic impacts.  
Overall, the literature shows that no significant attempt has been made to evaluate the 
effectiveness of I/D contracts on mitigating work zone traffic impacts. In particular, there has 
been no evaluation of a state’s completed use of I/D contracting over a period of time. This 
research showed just how much RUC can be saved with the proper use of I/D contracts by a 
DOT. Other DOT can use this research to evaluate their use of I/D contracts and compare their 
experience with Missouri’s. This could result in constructive collaboration between states to 
further increase the effectiveness of I/D contracts in the future. 
Previous evaluations of I/D contracts have typically been limited to single case studies, small 
sample sizes of projects, or a comparison of multiple types of alternative contracting. This 
research offers a large sample size of twenty projects that represent almost the complete use of 
I/D projects by MoDOT over a four-year span. This also resulted in an evaluation of the 
programmatic use of I/D contracts by a DOT. This type of evaluation was done by comparing 
I/D contracts to the average performance of all MoDOT contracts. This opened the door for 
continuous tracking of I/D contracts so DOT employees can easily observe how I/D contracts are 
performing over time. By doing this, it will become easier to make improvements to the I/D 
contracting process, justify further use, or even restrict use if certain I/D contracts are used 
inefficiently.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF I/D PROJECT EVALUATIONS 
Through their experience, the researchers in the NCHRP 652 report stated that meaningful 
quantitative data such as project duration, relative cost comparisons, I/Ds paid or charged were 
limited (Fick et al. 2010). The primary factor for determining whether an I/D contract was 
effective was whether the contractor was able to meet the I/D milestone and was paid an 
incentive for early completion. The items that had the greatest potential to erode the 
effectiveness of I/D provisions were the frequency and impact of excusable delays and overrun 
and underrun quantities. The report also stated that existing literature lacked quantitative data 
and analysis. This lack of quantitative project analysis of I/D projects is one central motivation 
for this research.  
A recent National Bureau of Economic Research publication discussed the results of quantitative 
analysis of 490 sample highway construction projects from Minnesota (2006). But this project 
focused on lane rental projects only and did not evaluate any I/D projects. The authors perform a 
simple delay analysis using Google Maps on a subset of 99 projects, but no meaningful traffic 
analysis is conducted.  
Strong (2006) evaluated design-build, lane-rental and A+B (cost + time) contracting methods by 
considering administration costs, project costs, management complexity, disruption to third 
parties, RUC, innovation, product/process quality, and funding flexibility.  Their methodology 
used both a survey of national experts and a review of projects. The reviewed projects included 
three A+B, one lane rental and one design-build. The three A+B and one lane rental projects 
were analyzed through a cost comparison of the following: first cost, final cost, bid durations, 
final durations, and approximate internal administrative costs as function of total project cost. 
The authors cautioned the reader about the significance of the results because of the small 
sample size of four projects. The authors also raised the issue that the effects of incentive clauses 
were difficult to separate from the effects of A+B contracting.  
The Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) (2006) examined six I/D projects 
between 2000 and 2005 with two of them involving liquidated savings. For each project, 
Mn/DOT examined the engineer estimates, low bid, maximum incentive amounts and the 
amount of incentives paid. For the incentive projects, Mn/DOT stated that contractors used extra 
effort to complete projects early in order to obtain bonuses, which strained Mn/DOT oversight 
staff.  But there was not enough data to determine if contractors were adjusting bids in 
anticipation of obtaining bonuses to offset costs. The contractors did not appear to expedite 
construction for liquidated savings projects.  
State’s uses of I/D provisions have shown to effectively reduce the time frame of construction 
projects that have a serious impact on traffic. Arditi et al. (1997) studied a number of projects for 
the Illinois Department of Transportation and found that 93.3% of projects that used I/D 
provisions finished on time or ahead of schedule compared to 41.4% that did not use I/D 
provisions.  
5 
Even though previous case studies provided detailed examples of I/D projects, it was difficult to 
compare the studies with each other in order to derive general conclusions. Some case studies 
involved California freeways such as I-15 (Lee and Thomas 2007) and I-710 (Lee et al. 2006). 
Another study was of I-95 in Delaware (FHWA 2004). For some of these studies, the authors 
performed traffic impact assessment of the project by monitoring closures and comparing the 
closure traffic with historical traffic data from the same location. Thus the authors sought to 
investigate whether the accelerated rehabilitation project resulted in tolerable traffic impact, but 
the authors did not seek to examine whether the incentive amounts earned corresponded to the 
traffic and safety impacts avoided. Such issues were not the focus of previous case studies, but 
are the main focus of the current report.  
In terms of survey-based methods for evaluating I/D contracts, the NCHRP project on I/D 
obtained surveys from thirty-two states and in-depth investigations of six states (Fick et al. 
2010). In terms of safety, the authors discussed the significant challenges that exist in evaluating 
the safety impacts of I/D contracts. The authors even claimed that in their judgment, it was 
nearly impossible to conduct a safety comparison between contracts that incorporate acceleration 
clauses and those that do not. And no one interviewed was aware of any attempt to conduct such 
an analysis. Further, the chapter entitled, “Evaluating I/D Effectiveness”, only discusses the need 
for adequate metrics to be developed for I/D effectiveness evaluation. This study again validates 
the need for conducting research on evaluating I/D projects using quantifiable metrics.  
Other survey-based studies examined I/D contracts together with A+B. One study concluded that 
A+B project increased bid price by 7.5% when compared with non-I/D projects (Strong et al. 
2005). Gillespie (1998) suggests that acceleration provisions, especially when combined with 
A+B bidding, tend to produce more innovative bids from contractors in order to compete in the 
bidding market and have the opportunity to earn the maximum incentive. A drawback to I/D 
provisions is that bid prices could rise due to the increased risk transferred to the contractor. As 
shown by Arditi et al. (1997), most I/D projects pay incentives, and the final cost of the project 
could be unnecessarily high if a completion date is too generous. In conclusion, even though 
there is a significant collection of I/D literature, there has not been a study that directly linked 
incentive/disincentives to a reduction in work zone traffic impacts.  
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3. BACKGROUND OF I/D CONTRACTING 
3.1. PROJECT SELECTION 
The FHWA (1989) stresses that I/D provisions should be restricted to critical projects where it is 
essential to keep user delays and traffic impacts to a minimum. Highway construction projects 
are all unique, and I/D may not be appropriate for all cases. I/D provisions are typically used in 
order to accomplish the objectives of reducing contract duration, completing construction before 
a special event, or to limit capacity impacts for high traffic flow areas (Cackler, 2010). Other 
objectives are also evaluated on a case-by-case basis. One major factor in deciding when to use 
I/D is high RUC that must be reduced. The FHWA (2006) has recommended the following 
characteristics in deciding when to use an I/D provision: 
 Projects on high traffic volume facilities, generally in urban areas 
 Projects that will complete a gap in a significant highway system 
 Major reconstruction or rehabilitation on an existing facility that will severely disrupt 
traffic 
 Major bridges out of service 
 Projects with lengthy detours 
3.2. ESTABLISHING CONTRACT TIME 
According to the FHWA (1989) the contract duration can be based on past performance or the 
critical path method (CPM). The past performance method requires engineering judgment to 
determine the normal completion time of a project based on historical data and also the amount 
of time it is possible to compress the schedule with increased labor and resources. The CPM 
method breaks the project into the individual components and bases the duration on what stages 
are critical to complete in order to move on to the next. Additional resources can be incorporated 
into the various stages in order to determine the possible compressed schedule. The contract time 
determination is a crucial component to I/D provisions. If the time is too short, contractors may 
feel it will be impossible for them to complete the work on time and therefore not bid on the 
project. If the time is too long, the contractor could complete the work without increased effort 
and the incentive goal for the DOT will not be maximized.  
3.3. RUC AND I/D 
According to the FHWA (1989), the determination of I/D amounts should be based on 
established construction engineering inspection costs, state related traffic control and 
maintenance costs, detour costs, and road user costs. Administrative costs such as construction 
inspection and state related costs are commonly covered in separate liquidated damages clauses 
and thus not always included into I/D amounts. The determination of I/D amounts should be on 
project-by-project bases and can be adjusted downward if necessary by using engineering 
judgment. The setting of the I/D amount from the RUC should provide a favorable benefit/cost 
ratio to the traveling public while also providing enough motivation to the contractor to 
accelerate construction. One report to the FHWA presents the components of RUC as travel 
7 
delay costs, vehicle operating costs, crash costs, emissions costs, and impacts of nearby projects 
(Mallela and Sadasivam 2011). One NCHRP report says that most states include only travel 
delay costs and vehicle operating costs in RUC calculations because these components are 
usually high enough to justify the use of an I/D (Fick et al. 2010).  
Once the RUC is determined then the daily rate can be set at any value at or lower than the RUC 
(Fick et al. 2010). Careful consideration is used to balance the number of incentive days and I/D 
rate, which are inversely proportional when there is a maximum incentive amount as discussed 
below. Mallela and Sadasivam (2011) suggest using a discount factor ranging from 0.2 to 1.0 of 
the RUC to set the I/D rate. This decision is based on factors such as market conditions, 
confidence in RUC estimates, work zone factors, and importance of early completion. The most 
aggressive discount factor would equate to the I/D rate being set just above the contractor’s 
acceleration costs. 
3.4. SETTING MAXIMUM I/D AMOUNTS 
The FHWA (1989) recommends a maximum amount of incentive payments be set in order to 
protect a DOT in cases where the estimated project time was too generous. A suggested cap of 
5% of the total project cost is recommended but different states have set their own caps. Table 3-1 
shows various caps for maximum incentives. The maximum incentive may also be determined 
based on the remaining budget for a project  (Fick et al. 2010). 
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Table 3-1 DOT Cap Rates (Gao 2010) 
State Cap 
Alabama None  
Arizona ±30days  
Arkansas None  
California Dollar Amount* 
Colorado None  
Delaware None  
Florida Varies  
Georgia None  
Idaho Varies  
Illinois None  
Indiana Dollar Amount*** 
Iowa None  
Kansas Dollar Amount* 
Maine Dollar Amount*** 
Maryland 5%  
Massachusetts None  
Michigan 5%  
Minnesota None  
Missouri 10%  
Montana Varies  
Nevada Varies  
New Hampshire None  
New Jersey Dollars 100,000 
New York 10%  
North Carolina Varies  
North Dakota 5%  
Ohio 5%  
Pennsylvania 5%  
South Dakota  None  
Tennessee None  
Utah Dollar Amount*** 
Virginia Dollar Amount**  
Washington 5%  
Wisconsin Varies  
Wyoming 6-8%  
*Fixed 
**Fixed except the A+B contracts 
***Fixed or negotiated not available  
An alternative approach to fixed cap rates is a regression model that was developed by Chen and 
Shr (2004) to establish maximum incentive amounts. This model used historical data of I/D 
contracts in Florida. The model equation is simple to use and is able to estimate the maximum 
incentive or maximum number of incentive days based on the contract amount and contract time. 
Because only contracts from Florida were used, the model would have to be calibrated for each 
state. 
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3.5. CONSIDERING CONTRACTOR ACCELERATION COSTS 
Chen et al. (2004) showed that contractor acceleration costs (CAC) increases exponentially the 
more the construction schedule is compressed. The knowledge of the CAC when determining 
appropriate I/D amounts is necessary so that the daily rate is set high enough to motivate the 
contractor’s acceleration efforts. In order to compress a construction schedule, a contractor must 
use additional resources, extended workdays, and/or additional shifts. Figure 3-1 illustrates this 
relationship as the construction time is decreased the cost to the contractor increases. The 
difficulty for DOT and researchers in understanding CAC is the lack of data from contractors. 
CAC information is proprietary and affects a contractors competitiveness.  
 
Figure 3-1 Determination of I/D amounts with CAC (Chen et al. 2004) 
Choi, Kwak, and Yu (2010) used a similar method to develop a regression equation based on the 
increased cost of construction compared to the amount of possible schedule compression for 
various resource levels. They used data obtained from the CA4PRS software. CA4PRS estimates 
construction schedules based on various rehabilitation strategies and contractor’s resource levels.  
The software estimates project costs and RUC. The methodology employed by Choi et al. (2010) 
was to incrementally increase the resource levels of four historical road rehabilitation projects in 
California and plot the increased cost versus the reduction in the projects duration. With this 
data, they were able to fit a quadratic equation to model the relationship. By finding the first 
order derivative of this equation, the maximum reduction of schedule as determined by a DOT 
could be entered to get the daily increase of construction costs experienced by the contractor. 
3.6. MODOT’S USE OF I/D CONTRACTING 
MoDOT uses I/D provisions to encourage early completion of construction projects. According 
to MoDOT’s Engineering Policy Guide (EPG) 237.8.6, Liquidated Savings Specified/Liquidated 
Damages Specified is the job special provision (JSP) used as the I/D provision in their contracts. 
The term disincentive is not used but Liquidated Damages Specified is used instead. Also there is 
careful mention in the EPG not to doubly assess damages if typical liquidated damages are used 
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along with I/D provisions. These features of the  MoDOT JSP matches closely the legal 
recommendations described in the chapter on legal analysis of incentive/disincentive contracts. 
The exact language used in the EPG describing the JSP shown below, and the actual JSP is 
reproduced in Appendix B. 
237.8.6 Liquidated Savings Specified/Liquidated Damages Specified 
This is a job special provision that encourages early completion of a project or phase of a 
project by offering an incentive while limiting construction time by assessing a liquidated 
damage specified. This provision is similar to A+B bidding except MoDOT sets the time. 
If the contractor finishes the described work ahead of time, the contractor receives an 
incentive. If the contractor finishes the described work after the time set, contractor is 
assessed a liquidated damage specified. If the time set is for project completion, the 
liquidated damage specified is not to be applied in addition to regular liquidated damages 
for the same costs (double assessment). The potential incentive amount is to be factored 
into the project budget as soon as possible. 
Suggested criteria for use: 
 Completion of milestones are critical to future work 
 There is a critical completion date 
 Long detours 
 Public or worker safety 
 Contract time is lengthy or short 
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4. DATA COLLECTION 
Construction Project data used in this study was obtained through MoDOT’s databases. Data 
from twenty I/D projects from the year 2008 to 2011 was utilized in this report. MoDOT 
contracts with I/D provisions include the Job Special Provision (JSP), Liquidated 
Damages/Liquidated Savings Specified. This JSP explicitly states that amounts received or 
charged for completion time are based on costs to the traveling public. The full JSP is available 
in Appendix B. 
MoDOT has used various forms of contracting to accelerate construction but only I/D projects 
were specifically considered in this study. Contracts with A+B bidding were not included. This 
study focuses on the effectiveness of the contract itself and not the bidding process. Evaluation 
of the bidding process (e.g. A+B bidding) could necessitate unavailable contractor information.  
A total of twenty-seven contracts with the I/D JSP were found in MoDOT’s database. Of those 
contracts, only twenty-one had the necessary data for this analysis. One of those twenty-one 
contracts was excluded because it was structured as a “lump-sum bonus” contract. It was also 
apparent that the lump-sum incentive was incorporated to motivate the contractor to finish 
construction before the weekend of a home University of Missouri football game. Because of 
this unique situation and the “lump-sum bonus” clause, it was decided to leave out this contract. 
Details on the twenty projects used in this study are shown in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 I/D Project Details 
No. 
Contract 
Days 
Original 
Contract 
Amount 
Description of Work 
AADT of 
Work 
Zone 
Incentive 
Period 
I/D Rate 
Max 
Incentive 
Allowed 
Max  
Incentive 
Days 
ID01 220 $588,464.00 Bridge rehabilitation 1,970 14 $2,000 $10,000 5 
ID02 54 $3,492,032.80 
Emergency flood 
repair, roadway scour 
1,858 34 $8,000 $80,000 10 
ID03 73 $2,633,985.63 
Emergency flood 
repair, roadway scour 
1,008 60 $3,000 $15,000 5 
ID04 25 $3,293,570.90 
Emergency flood 
repair, roadway scour 
1,858 25 $10,000 $100,000 10 
ID05 31 $1,290,131.07 
Emergency flood 
repair, roadway scour 
9,520 7 $12,000 $36,000 3 
ID06 180 $2,129,437.87 Bridge replacement  14,300 127 $15,000 $225,000 15 
ID07 93 $2,097,000.00 
Emergency bridge 
rehabilitation 
1,975 46 $10,000 $100,000 10 
ID08 78 $483,025.24 Bridge replacement 17,191 42 $5,000 $70,000 14 
ID09 260 $6,795,644.83 
Intersection 
improvement 
35,000 242 $10,000 $70,000 7 
ID10 297 $514,588.43 Bridge resurfacing 2,580 4 $3,840 $7,680 2 
ID11 236 $13,705,018.30 
Grading, optional 
pavement 
9,960 175 $15,000 $300,000 20 
ID12 273 $2,881,819.99 
Bridge rehab & 
bike/ped path 
30,000 135 $9,000 $156,000 18 
ID13 103 $574,492.26 Bridge rehabilitation 486 85 $2,000 $60,000 30 
ID14 205 $2,650,395.06 Resurfacing 2,560 12 $2,000 $10,000 5 
ID15 759 $14,838,238.82 Bridge replacement 1,470 365 $7,000 $504,000 72 
ID16 118 $559,158.73 
Replace concrete 
pavement 
16,760 17 $15,000 $25,000 1.667 
ID17 40 $331,913.90 Slide repair  10,692 23 $5,000 $25,000 5 
ID18 46 $104,681.15 Pipe replacement 20,283 14 $2,000 $10,000 5 
ID19 135 $1,064,668.53 Bridge rehabilitation 1,600 117 $13,000 $100,000 8 
ID20 234 $9,264,133.39 Bridge replacement  29,500 $90 $14,000 $448,000 32 
Ave. 173 $3,464,620 
N/A 
10529 82 $8,142 $117,584 14 
Med. 127 $2,113,219 6050 44 $8,500 $70,000 9 
Max. 759 $14,838,239 35000 365 $15,000 $504,000 72 
Min. 25 $104,681 486 4 $2,000 $7,680 2 
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On average, contract days were around 173 days. The average contract amount was 
approximately three and a half million per contract. The average I/D rate was around $8,000/day. 
The maximum incentive averaged almost $120,000, and the average maximum number of 
incentives days was 14 days. The I/D contracts in Table 4-1 covered a broad range. The largest 
number of contract days was 759 and the shortest was 25. The largest project amount was almost 
$15 million while the smallest was around $105,000. The I/D rate varied from $2000/day to 
$15,000/day.  
The I/D projects used in this study were spread across the state and involved a variety of 
different types of road construction. Of the twenty projects, eleven were in rural areas and nine 
were in urban areas. The urban projects were located mostly in the Kansas City and St. Louis 
metro areas with one also in Jefferson City. There were five emergency construction projects, 
four due to massive flooding in Northeast Missouri in 2011 and another due to flood damage to a 
bridge in 2010. Nine projects involved bridge rehabilitation or replacement. Full closure of a 
roadway segment or road access existed on eighteen of the twenty projects with fifteen of those 
involving only a full closure. Three projects had intersection connection access closures and two 
projects involved only partial closure or lane reduction. The location of the twenty projects can 
be seen in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1 I/D Project Locations 
For nine of the projects, the I/D was for the completion of a certain milestone of the construction. 
These projects included multiple phases or jobs and will be further classified only by the phase 
of construction that the I/D applied to. For example, a project with an I/D milestone involving 
reopening a rehabilitated bridge will be classified as full closure even if there was a non-I/D, 
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partial-closure phase before or after closing the bridge. For eight of the remaining eleven 
projects, the I/D period started when work started and finished when the road opened to traffic. 
Any remaining work was not included in the I/D as long as there was no need for any special 
traffic control. The final three contracts had I/D provisions that required entire project 
completion. All of the contracts had an I/D structure of either a specific completion date or a 
number of calendar days, no contract specified working days. Most of the contracts had regular 
liquidated damages for completion of all contract work that could be applied separately. These 
liquidated damages are carefully calculated to not double assess the same damages according to 
MoDOT’s EPG 237.8.6. Also, a few of the projects had separate liquidated damages specified or 
liquidated savings specified for different phases. These projects were typically the larger, more 
complex projects. For complete project details, see Appendix A. 
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5. WORK ZONE IMPACT METHODOLOGY 
The primary way I/D contracts minimize work zone impacts is through schedule reductions. To 
show the impacts that a reduced schedule has on RUC, twenty MoDOT I/D projects were 
analyzed in detail. Typically, I/D rates are set as a percentage of the actual RUC. This insures 
that the traveling public receives a favorable cost/benefit ratio (FHWA 1989). In order to 
determine how much the schedule reduction benefitted the road users for each project, the RUC 
must be computed. For this analysis, three typical cost components were used to quantify RUC: 
travel-delay costs (TDC), vehicle-operating costs (VOC), and crash costs (CC). In other words: 
 (5.1) 
5.1. TRAVEL DELAY COSTS 
TDC are the value of additional time incurred because of a work zone. For partial closure work 
zones, the MoDOT Work Zone Impacts Analysis Spreadsheet was used to calculate TDC 
(MoDOT, 2012a). This spreadsheet was developed based on the Highway Capacity Manual 
(TRB 2010) methodology. In the case of a detour caused by a full closure, travel delay is the 
difference between the time it takes to traverse the detour and the time it would have taken to use 
the normal route. The travel delay is then monetized by multiplying by the unit value of time 
(VOT) according to the equation below. 
 (5.2) 
where: 
DELAY = detour travel time – normal travel time, (hr/veh) 
AADT = Annual average daily traffic of closed road (veh/day) 
VOTcars = Value of time for passenger cars, ($/hr); $10.30/hr 
VOTtrucks = Value of time for trucks, ($/hr); $22.70/hr 
%cars = Percentage of AADT that is passenger cars (%) 
%trucks = Percentage of AADT that is trucks (%) 
The difference in time from the normal route and the detour route was determined using travel 
distances and speed limits. The assumption that there were no significant congestion effects due 
to the additional traffic shifted from the closed routes was validated by the actual AADT values 
for each project. Contract plans for each project provided the AADT and the percent of trucks. 
The value of time for passenger cars and trucks were obtained from the MoDOT Work Zone 
Impacts Analysis Spreadsheet (MoDOT, 2012a).   
For projects with partial closure or lane reductions, there is another component of TDC caused 
by the speed reduction through the work zone. Work zone speeds were found within the project 
plans. This component of TDC can be seen below. 

RUCTDCVOCCC

TDC
$
day





 Delay * AADT *(VOTcars*%carsVOTtrucks*%trucks)
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 (5.3) 
where: 
L = Length of the work zone (mi); 
= Work zone speed limit (mph); 
= Normal speed through the roadway segment (mph). 
5.2. VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS 
VOC are the mileage dependent expenditures generated by operating a vehicle. Cost items such 
as fuel use and vehicle wear and tear are included in VOC. For full closures, VOC are the 
additional costs due to the extra miles driven along the detour compared to the mileage of the 
normal route. The equation below shows how the VOC is calculated 
 (5.4) 
where: 
MILESadded = length of detour – length of normal route, (miles/veh) 
VOCcars = unit VOC for passenger cars, ($/mile); $0.403/mile 
VOCtrucks = unit VOC for trucks, ($/mile); $0.818/mile 
The difference in mileage from the normal route and the detour route was determined using road 
maps.  The unit VOC values were taken from AAA (2012) and Trego and Murray (2010) for 
passenger cars and trucks respectively.  
5.3. CRASH COSTS 
Crash costs for the various projects were calculated differently depending on the type of closure 
for the work zone. The method for calculating crash costs for the detour traffic is based on the 
Highway Safety Manual (HSM) (AASHTO 2010). For projects with partial-closure or lane-
reduction work zones, a method from Khattak (2002) was used. Khattak’s research was used in 
the HSM to calculate crash modification factors (CMF) for work zones. To determine crash costs 
with this method, the predicted number of crashes during the work zone is subtracted from the 
predicted number of crashes pre-work zone. This is done for both injury (including fatal crashes) 
and non-injury. A per-day cost is then calculated and added to the RUC. The equation below 
shows how crash costs for partial-closure and lane-reduction work zones are calculated. 
 (5.5) 

TDC
$
day





 AADT *
L
SWZ

L
SN





*(VOTcars*%cars VOTtrucks*%trucks)

SWZ

SN

VOC
$
day





 MILESadded * AADT * VOCcars*%carsVOCtrucks*%trucks 

Y  (x1)1.2659*(x2)1.1149*(x3)0.6718*e0.2257*x4 *e0.5126*x5 *e0.1988*x6 *e17.7748
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where: 
Y = expected number of total crashes in a given duration on work zone segments;  
x1 = average ADT of the work zone (vehicles per day);  
x2 = duration of observation (days);  
x3 = length of the work zones (km);  
x4 = 1 if the roadway is in urban area; 0 otherwise;  
x5 = 1 if injury producing crash; 0 otherwise;  
x6 = 1 if crashes recorded during work zones; 0 otherwise (pre-work zone). 
For projects with rural detours, the additional crash costs per day were calculated using chapter 
10 of the HSM (AASHTO 2010). The risk of additional crash costs is due to the extra mileage 
driven by the detoured traffic. Equation 10.6 from the HSM predicts the additional crash 
frequency of the detoured AADT due to the additional mileage (L) of the detour. Using this 
calculated frequency, the predicted additional annual crashes can be found. HSM equation 10.6 
is: 
 (5.6) 
where: 
Nspf rs = predicted total crash frequency for roadway segment base conditions; 
AADT = detoured average annual daily traffic volume (vehicles per day); 
L = additional detour length (miles) 
For projects with urban detours the additional crash costs per day were calculated using chapter 
12 of the HSM (AASHTO 2010). Five different crash types were calculated using this method 
from the HSM because of the unique characteristics of an urban setting. These crash types are 
multiple-vehicle non-driveway, single-vehicle, multiple-vehicle driveway-related, vehicle-
pedestrian, and vehicle-bicycle. Variables needed to calculate crash costs along an urban 
roadway are type of roadway segment, number of driveways, and classification of those 
driveways. The HSM allows for varying levels of detail while calculating crash costs. The 
calculations for this analysis used the most common roadway type along the detour and an 
estimate, based on aerial maps, of the number and type of driveways along the detour. These 
variables were captured with regression coefficients in the HSM. This resulted in an approximate 
value of the crash costs along the detours appropriate enough for RUC calculations. Due to the 
unavailability of traffic counts for roadways intersecting with the detour, intersection crash 
counts were not calculated. The HSM provides a method of estimating intersection crash costs 
but because these roads are typically small roads owned by the city, the traffic counts were not 
available. It is thus assumed that crash costs included in the RUC are a conservative value and 
real crash costs may be higher. The following equations were used to calculate crash costs for 
urban detours. 
  

Nspfrs AADT *L*365*10
6 *e0.312
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Multiple-vehicle non-driveway: 
  (5.7) 
where: 
= number of multiple-vehicle non driveway collisions per year; 
AADT =  average annual daily trafﬁc volume (vehicles/day) on roadway segment;  
L =  length of roadway segment (mi); 
a, b =  regression coefficients depending on roadway type. 
Single vehicle: 
  (5.8) 
where: 
= number of single-vehicle collisions per year; 
a, b =  regression coefficients depending on roadway type. 
Multiple-vehicle driveway-related: 
  (5.9) 
where: 
= number of multiple-vehicle driveway-related collisions per year; 
=  number of driveway-related collisions per driveway per year for driveway type j; 
=   number of driveways within roadway segment of driveway type j including all 
driveways on both sides of the road; 
t =  coefﬁcient for trafﬁc volume adjustment. 
Vehicle-pedestrian: 
  (5.10) 
where: 

Npedr = Number of vehicle-pedestrian crashes 
 
 
= pedestrian crash adjustment factor based on roadway type 

Nbrmv  e
(ab*ln(AADT )ln(L ))

Nbrmv

Nbrsv  e
(ab*ln(AADT )ln(L ))

Nbrsv

Nbrdwy  n j *N j *
AADT
15,000






all
driveway
types

( t )

Nbrdwy

N j

n j

Npedr  Nbr * f pedr

Nbr  Nbrmv  Nbrsv  Nbrdwy

f pedr
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Vehicle-bicycle: 
  (5.11) 
where: 

Nbike = Number of vehicle-bicycle crashes 
=  bicycle crash adjustment factor based on speed and roadway type. 
The total crash cost can be found by adding up these five types of urban crashes. This is shown 
in the equation below. To calculate the added crash cost along the detour route, the crash cost 
from the normal route must be subtracted from the detour route.  
  (5.12) 
A composite cost per crash was estimated using historic crash data from MoDOT and HSM 
(ASSHTO 2010) methodology. All work zone crashes from 2009 to 2011 were classified by 
severity. The 6749 total work zone crashes were composed of 2.70% fatal, 0.52% disabling, 
21.11% evident injury and 75.67% PDO crashes. According to HSM methodology, all crash 
costs were adjusted to 2011 values. The human costs were adjusted using the Consumer Price 
Index and the non-human societal costs were adjusted using the Employment Cost Index from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The unit crash cost of a work zone crash in Missouri in 2011 was 
$172,221. The crash cost, CC, is estimated using:  
  (5.13) 
where: 
Nspf = predicted additional annual crashes, (crashes/year) 
  

Nbike Nbr * fbike

fbike

Nspfur  Nbrmv  Nbrsv Nbrdwy Npedr  Nbike

CC
$
day






Nspf
365
*$172,221
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6. RESULTS 
6.1. BREAKDOWN OF RUC COMPONENTS 
For each of the twenty I/D projects used in this analysis, the RUC were calculated separately. 
Table 6-1 shows the breakdown of the three components used to calculate RUC: TDC, VOC and 
CC.  On average, the VOC was the largest component equating to approximately 50% of the 
RUC. TDC was the next largest at 35% and CC only amounted to 15%. The two projects with no 
VOC were projects with only partial closures and thus no detour routes. 
Table 6-1 RUC Components 
No. Daily TDC Daily VOC Daily CC Daily RUC 
ID01 $6,127 $9,368.71 $2,632.44 $18,129 
ID02 $26,249 $48,619.22 $11,711.24 $86,580 
ID03 $10,631 $20,048.21 $5,337.00 $36,016 
ID04 $26,249 $48,619.22 $11,711.24 $86,580 
ID05 $83,348 $157,298.96 $49,204.84 $289,851 
ID06 $15,616 $11,513.29 $3,742 $30,871 
ID07 $13,652 $18,865.94 $5,228.46 $37,747 
ID08 $49,596 $42,791.84 $11,747 $104,134 
ID09 $9,205 $12,147.00 $7,073 $28,425 
ID10 $12,579 $15,226.02 $2,334 $30,139 
ID11 $8,321 $980.00 $4,449.00 $13,750 
ID12 $2,501 $0.00 $1,250.00 $3,751 
ID13 $2,195 $2,649.92 $765.83 $5,611 
ID14 $9,148 $17,473.00 $4,873.00 $31,494 
ID15 $8,378 $18,171.49 $4,595.75 $31,145 
ID16 $1,182 $0.00 $427.00 $1,609 
ID17 $17,812 $11,952.96 $3,351 $33,116 
ID18 $1,584 $1,728.00 $1,811 $5,123 
ID19 $5,599 $5,455.58 $1,532.92 $12,587 
ID20 $34,409 $39,705.53 $15,213 $89,328 
Total $344,381 $482,615 $148,990 $975,986 
Average $17,219 $24,131 $7,450 $48,799 
% of RUC 35.29% 49.45% 15.27% 100.00% 
 
6.2. RUC SAVINGS ANALYSIS 
After evaluating twenty I/D projects,  Table 6-2 shows RUC savings benefitted the traveling 
public favorably. For a contractor to start earning incentives, the closed road segment must be 
reopened to traffic. Seventeen of the twenty contractors were able to open the road early and earn 
incentives. The other three contractors finished on time but did not earn any incentives. No 
contractor was assessed disincentives for any project. In Table 6-2, the number of days the 
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contractor was able to reduce from the incentive period is shown in the third column. The fourth 
and fifth columns show the calculated daily RUC and the total RUC saved because of the early 
completion. The net RUC savings is the incentives paid subtracted from the RUC savings.  
Table 6-2 RUC Savings 
No. 
Max 
Poss. 
Inc. Days 
Days 
Saved 
Daily RUC RUC Savings 
Incentive 
Paid 
Net RUC 
Savings 
ID01 5 5 $18,129 $90,643 $10,000 $80,643 
ID02 10 15 $86,580 $1,298,693 $80,000 $1,218,693 
ID03 5 0 $36,016 $0 $0 $0 
ID04 10 10 $86,580 $865,795 $100,000 $765,795 
ID05 3 4 $289,851 $1,159,406 $36,000 $1,123,406 
ID06 15 15 $30,871 $463,064 $225,000 $238,064 
ID07 10 2 $37,747 $75,493 $20,000 $55,493 
ID08 14 3 $104,134 $312,403 $15,000 $297,403 
ID09 7 20 $28,425 $568,500 $70,000 $498,500 
ID10 2 0 $30,139 $0 $0 $0 
ID11 20 20 $13,750 $275,000 $300,000 -$25,000 
ID12 18 21 $3,751 $78,771 $156,000 -$77,229 
ID13 30 32 $5,611 $179,549 $60,000 $119,549 
ID14 5 2 $31,494 $62,988 $4,000 $58,988 
ID15 72 0 $31,145 $0 $0 $0 
ID16 1.67 5.63 $1,609 $9,051 $25,000 -$15,949 
ID17 5 14 $33,116 $463,626 $25,000 $438,626 
ID18 5 5 $5,123 $25,615 $10,000 $15,615 
ID19 8 8 $12,587 $100,698 $100,000 $698 
ID20 32 32 $89,328 $2,858,487 $448,000 $2,410,487 
Total 278 214 
N/A 
$8,887,783 $1,684,000 $7,203,783 
Target (day 
of max 
incentive) 
278 278 $11,493,358 $2,351,680 $9,141,678 
Percent 100 64 77% 72% 79% 
Average 14 11 $48,799 $444,389 $84,200 $360,189 
Median 9 7 $31,008 $140,123 $30,500 $69,816 
 
Table 6-2 shows the total impact from the 20 I/D projects as 214 days reduced, around $8.9 
million in RUC saved, around $1.7 million in incentives paid, and around $7.2 million in net 
RUC saved. The acceleration of the projects also resulted in almost 9 million VMT (vehicle 
miles traveled) saved for detoured traffic. This was calculated by multiplying together AADT, 
mileage difference of detours, and days reduced. The incentives were paid out as follows: seven 
contractors finished exactly on the day in which the full incentive could be earned, seven 
contractors finished earlier than the maximum number of incentive days (earned maximum 
incentive), three contractors earned partial incentives, and three contractors finished at the 
original contract time. The row entitled “Target” represents the total amounts if all contractors 
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finished on the day to earn maximum incentives and is used as a reference point for comparison. 
Note that this does not imply that meeting the maximum number of incentive days was the most 
important goal. Table 6-2 shows 77% of the contracted RUC savings were realized, 72% of 
contracted incentives were paid and 79% of the net savings were realized. It is arguable what the 
ideal percentages should be, but the values indicate that MoDOT received close to the upper 
limit of their expected results. The return on investment of $1.00 of incentives is $5.30 of RUC 
savings.  
Seven projects finished earlier than the maximum incentive day. In these cases, the contractor 
did not earn additional incentive but further RUC were saved. The total additional days reduced 
was almost 37, which amounted to nearly $1.5 million in RUC. Therefore it is possible for the 
RUC savings and net RUC savings to be higher than the values in Table 6-2 for the target row. 
6.3. EFFECTS OF PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 6-3 below shows how various characteristics can affect the outcome of I/D contracts.  Of 
the twenty projects, eleven were rural which included five emergency projects. There were no 
urban emergency projects. Six rural, non-emergency projects were separated from the emergency 
projects because of the uniqueness of the emergency projects. These six projects included four 
bridge closures, an access-restricted intersection, and ramp closures at an interstate interchange. 
The five emergency projects were unique. Four involved reopening flooded roads that led to key 
crossings across the Missouri River. The other emergency project was the repair of a bridge from 
a separate flooding event. The fifth project was compounded by another bridge closure in the 
area. These projects led to considerably higher RUC due to extremely long detours. The fifteen 
full closure projects include five urban projects and ten of the eleven rural projects, including all 
five emergency projects.  The urban projects include the five full-closure urban projects as well 
as two with access-restricted intersections and two with partial closure of the roadway.  
Table 6-3 below shows that the rural, non-emergency projects resulted in the smallest savings 
and only netted about one-third of the actual RUC saved. Although not shown in Table 6-3, all of 
the projects combined netted 81% of RUC with a target of 80% (calculated from Table 6-2). 
Also, the rural, non-emergency projects reduced the fewest number of target days. The lower 
performance was partly due to the low average daily RUC of $18,786 (see Table 6-4 below). 
Because of this, the incentives were set closer to the actual RUC to motivate the contractor to 
accelerate construction. Proportionally, even at the target number of days, rural, non-emergency 
contracts paid the most incentives compared to the RUC savings. The fact that only 23% of the 
target RUC savings was realized indicates that rural projects may not be the most suitable for I/D 
provisions.  
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Table 6-3 RUC Savings by Project Characteristic 
Characteristic 
Projects 
(ID##) 
 
Days 
Saved 
RUC 
Savings 
Incentive 
Paid 
Net RUC 
Savings 
Net % 
RUC 
Saved 
Rural, Non-
Emergency  
(6 projects) 
01, 11, 13, 14, 
15, 19 
Total 67 $708,878  $474,000  $234,878  33% 
Target 140 $3,034,583  $984,000  $2,050,583  68% 
Percent 48% 23% 48% 11%   
Urban  
(9 projects) 
06, 08, 09, 10, 
12, 16, 17, 18, 
20 
Total 116 $4,779,518  $974,000  $3,805,518  80% 
Target 100 $5,300,082  $1,036,680  $4,263,402  80% 
Percent 116% 90% 94% 89%   
Full Closure  
(15 projects) 
01, 02, 03, 04, 
05, 06, 07, 08, 
10, 13, 14, 15, 
17, 19, 20 
Total 142 $7,930,846  $1,123,000  $6,807,846  86% 
Target 226 $10,923,567  $1,790,680  $9,132,887  84% 
Percent 63% 73% 63% 75%   
Emergency  
(5 projects) 
02, 03, 04, 05, 
07 
Total 31 $3,399,387  $236,000  $3,163,387  93% 
Target 38 $3,158,693  $331,000  $2,827,693  90% 
Percent 82% 108% 71% 112%   
Note:  Projects may be included with one or more characteristic 
The nine urban projects reduced 16 more days than the target. This is the result of four of the 
contracts finishing earlier than the maximum incentive day. Interestingly, these extra days did 
not result in total RUC savings higher than the total target RUC savings. This is due to projects, 
which did not finish beyond the target, having a greater influence on the RUC savings. The 
project with the highest RUC ($104,134/day) only reduced 3 of 14 possible days. Altogether, the 
urban projects netted 80% of the RUC saved which was the same as the target percentage. At  
90% RUC savings, nearly the entire target RUC savings was realized which indicates the I/D 
was successful in accelerating construction for urban projects. 
Three-quarters of the twenty projects used were full-closure projects. Because of the larger 
sample size, the results might be more reliable than the results for other subcategories of 
projects. These full-closure projects netted 86% of the RUC savings, which was a higher 
percentage than the target of 84%. A total of 142 days were reduced, which was 63% of the 
target number. Reducing the target number of days is beyond actual expectations for I/D projects 
so reducing 63% of the target days is considered a success. The 63% of days reduced along with 
73% of the target RUC saved indicates that the I/D rate and the maximum I/D cap are being set 
at appropriate values, balancing the contractor’s ability to accelerate construction and the 
agency’s desire to minimize RUC. 
The five emergency projects are the only subcategory to save more RUC than the target value. 
This occurred even though only 82% of the target days were reduced.  Two projects that had the 
highest RUC finished ahead of the target causing the 108% RUC savings. The fact that 93% of 
the RUC savings was realize cannot be used to compare to the other project characteristics fairly 
because of the unique circumstances of emergency contracts. Nonetheless, all indications are that 
the inclusion of the I/D with these emergency contracts saved considerable RUC at a relatively 
low cost to MoDOT. 
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6.4. DISCOUNT OF RUC FOR I/D RATES 
The literature showed that I/D rates are typically set from 20% to 100% of the RUC depending 
on acceleration goals and RUC calculation methods. The amount that the I/D rate is discounted 
from the RUC affects the contractor’s motivation for acceleration and magnitude of achievable 
net RUC savings. Table 6-4 below shows that on average, MoDOT only sets the I/D rate at 
16.7% of the RUC. Considering the findings earlier in this chapter, this suggests that RUC can 
be discounted significantly to set I/D amounts and still successfully accelerate the contractor’s 
schedule. Table 6-4 also shows that MoDOT is capping the maximum incentive at an average of 
3.4% of the contract amount. This was calculated by finding the percent of the maximum 
allowed incentive to the original contract amount. This is below the suggested cap of 5% by the 
FHWA (1989). 
Table 6-4 Average Daily Rates 
Division 
Average I/D 
rate 
Average 
Daily RUC 
I/D % of 
RUC 
Incentive 
Cap 
Rural, non-emergency $6,833 $18,786 36.4% 2.9% 
Urban $8,760 $36,277 24.1% 4.5% 
Full closure $7,456 $61,555 12.1% 4.0% 
Emergency $8,600 $107,355 8.0% 2.6% 
All projects $8,142 $48,799 16.7% 3.4% 
 
6.5. SUMMARY OF MODOT’S I/D USE 
 The total cost of all contracts was $69,292,400.90 
 The total contract days was 3460 
 The number of critical I/D days was 1634 
 The percent of critical I/D days that an incentive could be earned was 17% 
 13% of critical I/D days were actually reduced 
 $8.9 million in RUC was saved or almost a half million dollars per contract 
 Total incentives paid was around $1.7 million 
 7 projects finished earlier than the day to earn the maximum incentive 
 7 projects finished at the maximum incentive day 
 3 projects earned partial incentives 
 3 projects finished at the I/D deadline (no incentive earned) 
 No contractor was charged a disincentive 
 Average I/D rate was set at 16.7% of the daily RUC 
 The average incentive was capped at 3.4% of the original contract amount 
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7. STATE PROGRAMMATIC EVALUATION 
In addition to the analysis of individual projects in the previous section, a programmatic 
comparison between I/D projects and all MoDOT projects was also conducted. MoDOT 
publishes a quarterly Tracker report. The purpose of the Tracker is to measure the performance 
of tangible goals set by the agency. So far MoDOT has not published measures specifically for 
I/D contracts. The following measures, currently recorded in Tracker, are areas where I/D 
contract performance could be compared to other contracting methods. By including I/D 
performance measures into a results based data tracking system like MoDOT’s Tracker, it would 
be possible to set and achieve goals based on the motivations behind using I/D contracts. The 
twenty I/D contracts will be evaluated to see if the use of I/D provisions is an effective 
contracting technique. 
The data for the overall MoDOT construction program was obtained from the Tracker, while the 
I/D project data was computed using the data described in previous sections. The following four 
measures were used for programmatic analysis: the percentage deviation of programmed cost 
versus final cost, the percentage of projects completed on time, the percentage of contract 
change, and the number of bids per call.   
7.1. BUDGETING FOR I/D CONTRACTS 
The ability of a project to stay on budget is becoming more and more important as funding for 
transportation is becoming harder to come by. One way of measuring this ability is by tracking 
the percent of programmed cost as compared to the final cost. Estimates for programmed costs 
are done early in project development but are important because programmed costs are used to 
set the budget for all future projects. The MoDOT Tracker reports the programmed project cost 
as compared to the final project cost for this very reason. These costs include design, right of 
way purchases, utilities, construction, inspection, and other miscellaneous costs. Ideally, the 
deviation in programmed versus final cost should be 0%. Negative numbers indicate the final 
cost was lower than the programmed cost. Five out of the twenty I/D projects were not used for 
this measure due to the lack of data on program estimates. Four of those five projects were 
emergency flood repairs and thus were not programmed in advance. For the period between 2008 
and 2011, the deviation in cost was -7.30% for MoDOT projects as a whole and -11.82% for I/D 
projects. The average I/D percentage deviation was almost 4.5% more than all of MoDOT’s 
projects indicating, perhaps, that I/D projects had much greater uncertainty and required more 
conservative programmed costs. Maximum incentives were only 2.98% of programmed estimate 
or $2.10 million for these fifteen contracts. Therefore it was not just the difficulties of budgeting 
for unknown incentive payments that were to blame. Actual incentive payments were only 
2.32% of final contract costs or $1.44 million. It could be possible that MoDOT assumed that the 
I/D provision would result in higher bids from contractors due to more risk transferred to the 
contractor.  
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7.2. SCHEDULING I/D CONTRACTS 
The ability of a project to stay on schedule is another important measure of programming 
performance. Figure 7-1 compares the on-time performance of I/D projects versus all projects for 
the years 2008 to 2011. Figure 7-1 shows both unadjusted and adjusted data. The adjusted data 
reflects actual contract changes negotiated between MoDOT and the contractor. The schedule for 
the I/D projects considers the entire contract time and not just the portion of the project that had 
I/Ds. The findings show that I/D projects were completed on-time 100% of the time while all 
projects ranged from 91% to 97% if adjustments were taken into account.  For unadjusted values, 
I/D projects were completed 83% of the time in 2010 and 2011, but MoDOT’s projects as a 
whole were completed 79% and 74% of the time.  
 
Figure 7-1 Percentage of Projects Completed on Time 
7.3. I/D CONTRACT AMOUNT CHANGES 
The percent change for finalized contracts represents the percentage difference of total 
construction payouts to the original award. This reflects changes made to the project after they 
were awarded to the contractor and does not include incentive payouts. Figure 7-2 shows 
percentage change for four years of I/D versus all MoDOT projects. Positive values reflect 
overruns while negative values reflect underruns. MoDOT had a target of keeping the percentage 
within ±2%. At first glance, I/D projects appear to require more changes. However, there were 
some outliers in the I/D data. The 2008 data was skewed by a project with a slope failure near the 
end of construction, and the 2011 data was skewed by an emergency contract with additional 
work added to the project after receding floodwaters showed more damage to the road than 
expected. When the outliers were removed, the I/D Selected data shows that I/D projects all fell 
within 2% of the original award.  
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Figure 7-2 Percent Change in Finalized Contracts 
7.4. MARKET COMPETITION 
One concern with I/D contracts is that the innovation required for accelerating projects might 
reduce the number of capable bidders. This is because acceleration could involve the use of 
multiple shifts, night shifts, newer technologies and flexible scheduling. This concern was not 
realized in actual project data. Figure 7-3 compares the average number of bids per call for all 
projects as compared to I/D projects. Except for 2010, there were more bids received per call for 
I/D projects than for all MoDOT projects. Assuming that all bidders were qualified to undertake 
accelerated projects, this result shows that the potential for incentive bonuses outweighed the 
complexity associated with acceleration. 
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Figure 7-3 Average Number of Bids per Call 
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8. SURVEY OF I/D USE 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, NCHRP 652 was a recent project that examined I/D 
provisions in highway construction contracts (Fick et al., 2010). This project conducted in-depth 
DOT and contractor interviews from the states of Florida, Ohio, New York, California, 
Oklahoma and Utah. Since none of these states are in the SWZDI region, it was important to 
capture DOT and contractor perspectives from the state of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and 
Wisconsin. The surveys employed in the current project differed from the NCHRP 652 surveys, 
as the focus of the current project is on work zone impacts.  
Surveys were sent out to DOT and contractors to obtain their perspectives on I/D contracts. DOT 
contacts were identified by searching each state’s website for personnel in various divisions such 
as contracting, alternative contracting, construction, and planning. A number of states did not list 
contact information for necessary personnel.  
Seventy-one surveys were sent out to DOT employees in thirty-four states. This survey had thirty 
responses of which twenty-eight completed the survey. A total of twenty-two different states 
answered the survey. These states were Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Note that 
all SWZDI states responded to the survey.  
Contractors were identified by using a list of prime contractors that are registered or have 
worked with MoDOT before. Many of these contractors are national or international companies, 
thus they would have experience working in multiple states. Contact information was identified 
using contractor websites. A total of 114 surveys were sent out to contractors and twenty-one 
responses were received. Seven additional contractors responded but did not fully complete the 
survey. Only eleven had experience with I/D contracts that finished the survey. The surveys 
instructed the responders to only consider contracts with I/D provisions and not A+B bidding. 
The respondents, both DOT employees and contractors, were both kept anonymous.  
The surveys were primarily designed to capture qualitative measures and opinions of effective 
I/D contracts. The following survey results captures unquantifiable issues associated with pre-
construction activities, during-construction activities, and unforeseeable circumstances. Various 
project issues were presented and respondents were asked how each contributed to the success of 
accelerating construction. These surveys were added to supplement the results of the I/D project 
evaluation because there are more factors affecting the success of schedule reduction than the 
amount of the I/D rate set by the DOT. Except for one respondent, everyone else (96.6%) replied 
that their DOT used I/D provisions to accelerate construction. One respondent said, “I/D is part 
of our Standard Specifications” and another said, “Innovative contracting is to be considered in 
every project but have had none in the past year.”  
In Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2, DOT’s and contractors were asked how each issue contributed to 
the success of accelerating construction. The top two issues that the DOT answered either 
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significantly or vey significantly were “well-defined project scope” and “timely problem 
resolution”. This result is consistent with the literature. Changes in a project’s scope will almost 
always add time to a project. Also, a contractor will recognize if a project has a vague or poorly 
defined scope. This increases the risk to the contractor, and such risk will then be reflected in 
higher bids. Timely problem resolution is important for I/D projects since a significant amount of 
time-dependent money is at risk. MoDOT’s I/D JSP does not allow for adjustments on the 
incentive deadline but only for disincentives. Problems that the contractor has no control over 
could result in lost incentives. It is a positive sign for I/D contracts that the DOT recognize the 
importance of quick problem resolution.  
The next two issues that DOT felt were important to the success of I/D contracts were 
“communication during construction with the contractor” and “Preconstruction planning”. 
Communication with the contractor is similar to timely problem resolution. Both issues keep the 
construction process running smoothly. Preconstruction planning helps to insure that the 
construction will stay on schedule and reduces the likelihood of problems arising. “Flexible start 
date” was the least important issue for the success of accelerating construction according to both 
DOT and contractors. The NCHRP 652 report found that I/D contracts tend to have more bidders 
if there was a flexible start date (Fick et al 2010). This increases the competitiveness of the 
market, which could result in a lower contract award amount. This implies that a flexible start 
date has more influence on the price paid for acceleration and not the acceleration itself. The 
responses from the DOT survey are highly supported by the contractor’s responses. For the four 
issues that were most important to the DOT, all of the contractors answered that the issues were 
either significant or very significant to the acceleration of construction.  
 
Figure 8-1 DOT Responses to Acceleration Success Issues 
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Figure 8-2 Contractor Responses to Acceleration Success Issues 
DOT respondents were asked about what project characteristics most influence the decision to 
use I/D. The list of characteristics presented in the survey was taken from an FHWA  contracting 
curriculum (FHWA, 2006) and observed characteristics of MoDOT’s projects. Figure 8-3 shows 
that the two most influential characteristics are high traffic volumes facilities and major 
construction that will severely disrupt traffic. The second most influential are urban bridges and 
lengthy detours. The respondents were also asked if there were any specific project characteristic 
that had to exist before I/D was considered. 45.5% responded no, 23% responded that there 
needs to be major disruptions to the public, and the rest either just said yes without any specifics 
or brought up another characteristic such as project cost threshold.  
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Figure 8-3 DOT Responses to Factors Affecting I/D Use 
Respondents were asked how they set their I/D rates. The answers varied significantly among the 
sample. A third of the respondents used a numerical range between 10% and 100% of the RUC. 
22% did not assign a quantitative percentage but said the amount was highly project dependent. 
Two respondents noted that the amount was set to achieve the intended goal, i.e. to induce 
acceleration. The related question of how contractors establish their construction acceleration 
costs were not asked of contractors. The question was not asked because such information is 
confidential as it affects a contractor’s competiveness.  
The challenges of I/D use were ranked by respondents on a scale from very significant to not at 
all. Figure 8-4 shows DOT responses. According to DOT, the most significant challenges were 
poorly defined project scope, plans and specifications errors and utility conflicts. The least 
significant were weather delays, difficulty in scheduling activities and worker morale.  The 
corresponding contractor responses are shown in Figure 8-5. Contractors ranked almost all 
challenges as significant. They agreed with DOT that worker morale and difficulty in scheduling 
activities were not very significant. A major difference in the response between DOT and 
contractor was that the contractor thought weather delays were a more significant challenge 
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Figure 8-4 DOT Responses to Challenges to I/D Use 
 
Figure 8-5 Contractor Responses to Challenges to I/D Use 
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One question asked directly about the impact of the I/D provision to motivate construction 
acceleration. A majority of DOT respondents (77.8%) answered that the impact was significant 
or very significant. The contractor responses were similar at 72.7%. A related question asked if 
projects could be further accelerated if the number of incentive days were increased. 18.5% of 
DOT respondents replied definitely or probably, but 45.5% of contractors replied definitely or 
probably. Perhaps this reflects a DOT misconception that contractors would not be further 
motivated to accelerate beyond a certain number of days. This result would suggest to DOT to 
try more incentive days if the budget allows on a particular project.  
As previously discussed in the literature review, some suggest that some contractors might 
underbid on the contract amount with the hope of making up the profit with incentives. Even 
though a survey might not be the best instrument to explore this question, it could provide some 
insight into the validity of this suggestion. DOT and contractors were asked if I/D provisions 
typically have significant impact on bid amounts, and if I/D provisions result in higher or lower 
bids than normal. Table 8-1 shows survey the. Neutral responses were the majority for all three 
questions for both DOT respondents and contractors. For both parties, there were more responses 
that disagreed that I/D resulted in either higher or lower bids. It appears that the survey evidence 
does not support the notion that bid amounts are affected by I/D provisions.  
Table 8-1 DOT and Contractor Responses to I/D Effect on Bid Amount 
I/D provisions typically:  
DOT (%) Contractor (%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
or 
Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree or 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
or 
Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree or 
Agree 
Have significant impact on 
bid amounts than normal 7.41 44.44 18.52 0.00 36.36 27.27 
result in higher bids for the 
job than normal 18.52 40.74 0.00 27.27 36.36 9.09 
result in lower bids for the 
job than normal 14.81 44.44 7.41 18.18 45.45 9.09 
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9. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE/DISINCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
Legal citation differs significantly from other forms of citation including what is common in 
transportation engineering. For example court cases and statutes require very precise descriptions 
and could differ among different states. In order to prevent confusion, a completely different 
citation system is employed in this chapter, and a separate reference list is included at the end of 
this chapter.   
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Code of Federal Regulations defines an incentive/disincentive (I/D) for early completion as 
“a contract provision which compensates the contractor a certain amount of money for each day 
identified critical work is completed ahead of schedule and assesses a deduction for each day the 
contractor overruns the incentive/disincentive time.” (1) The law concerning I/D contracts and 
contract acceleration is very fluid, since such practices are relatively new and not well-litigated. 
For example, one well-known case in Tennessee that allowed the modification of an incentive 
clause, Ray Bell I (2), was overturned in Ray Bell II in 2011 (3). The purpose of this chapter is to 
alert agency attorneys and perhaps contract engineers of some of the issues that have surfaced in 
court cases concerning I/D contracts. The intent is to make this chapter accessible to non-
attorneys, but important legal language and terms of art had to be used for conciseness.  
The most important influence behind I/D contracts in transportation is arguably the Code of 
Federal Regulations and specifically § 635.127 in Title 23, which concerns provisions affecting 
contract time overruns (4). The contract procedures described in Title 23, Part 635, including § 
635.127, is applicable to all Federal-aid highway projects. Thus these regulations influence 
significantly the contracting practices of the department of transportation (DOT) of various 
states.  
The Federal Register (5) discusses the background and motivation behind the authorization of 
I/D clauses in 1987 in § 630.305 (6), re-designated as § 635.127 in 1997 (7). The regulations 
enacted in Subpart 635 were intended to improve the assessment of damages for contractor 
overruns in the following ways. First, the regulations discarded outdated damages rate tables 
from 1972 that were based on nationwide averages. Second, they instituted a requirement for 
states to maintain and update their own rate tables. Third, the regulations addressed the use of 
liquidated damages to include delay-related costs beyond the daily construction engineering (CE) 
costs. Fourth, they corrected a previous inequity in the computation of the federal pro rata share 
of liquidated damages. And last, I/D was defined and described. One motivation for authorizing 
I/D clauses is to facilitate the inclusion of road user costs (RUC) such as delays and safety 
impacts in critical projects. RUC are damages in addition to construction engineering (CE) costs.  
Finch (8) describes the legal basis for disincentive clauses as the liquidated damage provision 
from typical construction contracts. The often cited United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (205 
U.S. at 105) is a paradigm case for illustrating the enforceability of liquidated damages (9) (10). 
In terms of construction contracts, Harp (11) suggests that the vast majority of courts have 
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followed the lead of the Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. United States which held that a 
liquidated damage clause is not contrary to public policy and is a suitable means of inducing 
performance, or of providing compensation in the case of failure to perform (12). If I/D is rooted 
in liquidated damages, then why stray from the foundation by introducing the concept of 
disincentives? The section entitled “Discussion of Legal Issues” will present some reasons for 
replacing disincentives with liquidated damages.  
Although all fifty states and the federal government have enacted statutes with respect to 
liquidated damages (10), the three typical liquidate damages enforceability elements are: 1) 
damages are uncertain and difficult to prove, 2) parties must have intended for the liquidated 
damages in advance, and 3) the stated amount must be a reasonable estimate of the loss upon 
breach (13). The well-known contradiction between the first and third elements is the 
requirement for a reasonable estimate which also has to be uncertain (11). In the majority of 
jurisdictions, reasonable is interpreted as not being disproportionate to the probable loss at the 
time of the contract (14). However, minority jurisdictions require that there be a reasonable 
approximation between the liquidated amount and the actual loss and not just probable loss (11).     
In general, construction damages resulting from a contractor’s failure to complete work within a 
specified time is the value of the use of the building for the period of delay (15). Harp (11) 
explains that this value includes engineering charges, losses in toll revenues, if applicable, and 
cost to the public. The last category includes value of time lost in delay, extra fuel expended, 
increases in accident frequency and severity, economic impact of surrounding areas, and 
inconvenience to adjacent property owners. The difficulty in establishing the cost to the public 
might be one motivation for introducing the concept of I/D.  
Heckman suggests that a symmetric I/D structure has a higher likelihood of enforceability 
because an incentive is offered to offset the potential for disincentive damages (16). 
Traditionally, the most significant component of an owner’s delay is actual damages in the form 
of lost revenues. For a DOT, however, the impact of delays is not in lost revenues but in road 
user costs (RUCs) and other societal costs. Thus DOTs might face difficulties in proving 
consequential damages because of foreseeability and reasonable certainty requirements. These 
issues might be the reason why current I/D contracting practices incorporate separate liquidated 
damages and I/D clauses into the same contract. Most agencies attribute liquidated damages and 
disincentives to different types of damages that could result from a breach. According to NCHRP 
652, liquidated damages are typically based solely on the recovery of an agency’s daily 
construction engineering costs while incentives and disincentives are based on road user costs 
(17). Another justification for the collection of RUC is based on the parens patriae doctrine 
which says the federal government and the states may vindicate the interest of their citizens 
under appropriate circumstances (18). 
 On the surface, there is symmetry in incentives and disincentives since they are both designed to 
accelerate contract performance (10). But the legal foundations for incentive and disincentive 
clauses are quite different. Thus the promotion of symmetry in I/D clauses could actually work 
against enforceability. The concern for incentive clauses is that such clauses might run afoul of 
state competitive bidding statutes (19). Such statutes are designed to prevent favoritism and 
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fraud, and to ensure uniform and equal bidding. A potential problem in using incentives is the 
strategy of bidding low in anticipation of receiving bonus payments to make up for the initial bid 
price. Such problems are different from the ones encountered in disincentive clauses.  
Incentive and disincentive clauses also differ in terms of practical consequences. It is unlikely 
that contractors, who are entitled to a bonus, would challenge its validity; thus potential litigants 
are reduced to competitors or taxpayers. Furthermore, incentives do not have to be paired with 
disincentives. Harp (11) argues that courts have not held that the lack of a bonus provision 
rendered a liquidated damage provision unenforceable.  
9.2. CASE FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Since most court cases involve multiple issues, the facts from important modern I/D cases are 
first explained in this section. Then the various legal issues from these cases will be discussed 
issue by issue in the next section. 
Milton Cases 
Two companion cases are referred to as Milton II (20) and I (21). Milton II affirmed the rulings 
on road user costs and a disincentive provision from the Milton I case. Both cases involved a 
dispute over disincentive payments to the amount of $534,000 that was withheld from the 
contractor by the highway department. The contract involved the construction of two interstates: 
I-65 and I-59 in Jefferson County, Alabama. The total cost of the projects was around $7.7 
million and $4.4 million respectively. The incentive/disincentive contract specified that the 
project must be completed and accepted within 330 calendar days for I-65 and 210 calendar days 
for I-59. For each day of overrun, the contractor was assessed a disincentive payment of $5000 
per day for I-65 and $4000 per day for I-59, up to 60 calendar days. The disincentive amounts 
were in addition to liquidated damages which were $600 per day for I-65 and $450 per day for I-
59. Milton exceeded the time for completion by 156 days for I-65 and by 72 days for I-59. This 
led to the imposition of $93,600 in liquidated damages and $300,000 in disincentives for I-65, 
and $32,400 in liquidated damages and $240,000 in disincentives for I-59.  
One important issue to note is the standard of review that was applied in this decision. The lower 
court had granted summary judgment in favor of the highway department, meaning the court 
determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that could be litigated. Therefore, in 
its review, the Alabama Supreme Court viewed all inferences in the light most favorable to the 
contractor, Milton. This case illustrates one end of the spectrum of decisions: decisions that 
invalidated incentive/disincentive contracts. Not only did the Alabama court overturn the 
summary judgment from the lower court, it considered the issue over the incentive/disincentive 
contract as a matter of law and decided it on the merits directly without remanding the case back 
to the lower court.  
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Ray Bell Cases 
These companion cases involved a dispute over incentive payment for constructing the I-40/I-
240 Midtown Interchange in Memphis, Tennessee (22) (23). The funding was split 90% from the 
FHWA and 10% from Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT). The funding structure 
was significant because of the FHWA policy to eliminate the use of the pro-rata method for 
calculating time extensions on quantity overruns. In accordance with this policy, TDOT included 
a “no excuse bonus” provision that specified that the completion date will not be adjusted for any 
reason except for catastrophic events. The contract specified that the project shall be completed 
in its entirety on or before December 15, 2006. The incentive payment of $10,000 per day was 
capped at a maximum of $2 million, and the disincentive payment, also at $10,000 per day, was 
uncapped. Ray Bell requested a 289-day extension for all dates but did not accept TDOT’s offer 
of a 137-day extension of the completion and disincentive dates and no extension of the 
incentive date. After the completion of the contract, Ray Bell requested a 362-day extension that 
was again countered by the same 137-day extension offer from TDOT. TDOT determined that 
the project was substantially completed on December 17, 2006, thus no incentives were paid.  
Ray Bell claimed it was entitled to $2.5 million in incentives. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
applied a de novo standard of review meaning there was no presumption of correctness to the 
lower court’s ruling in favor of Ray Bell.  
James Case 
This case involved a dispute over the disincentive amount that was withheld for the construction 
of the Louisiana Avenue Interchange on I-10 (24). The contract between James and the 
Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) was for the amount of around $19 
million and a completion date of June 22, 2003, or a 440 day duration. The disincentive amount 
was specified as a $10,000 daily road user cost. James was assessed $420,000 for completing the 
project on August 28, 2003. A de novo review standard was used.  
River Road Case 
Even though this case did not involve an incentive/disincentive contract or road construction, it 
is included because the holding cited and discussed Milton II (25). River Road was a dredging 
subcontractor to Radcliff for a liquid-bulk terminal project with the Alabama State Port 
Authority. River Road claims additional expenses of around $1.1 million for the unanticipated 
discovery of rock during dredging. The standard of review of the trial court’s denial of the 
motion to dismiss was to view River Road’s complaint in the most favorable light.  
Bonacorso Case 
The Department of Public Works (DPW) had contracted with Bonacorso Construction (BCC) to 
rebuild two bridges on I-93 in Reading, Massachusetts (26). The completion date was November 
28, 1987, and a disincentive of $4000 per day was assessed for late completion. DPW and BCC 
had amended the contract with a new completion date of December 6, 1988, but work was not 
completed on that date. The contract incorporated DPW’s standard specifications which provided 
that the contractor shall have no claim for damages of any kind on account of any delay. 
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Although the standard of review was not stated explicitly, the court appears to have made a de 
novo review.  
Good Hope Case 
This case will be referred by the contractor’s name, Good Hope. Alabama Department of 
Transportation (ALDOT) had entered into three contracts with Good Hope to undertake various 
road projects (27). The contracts specified liquidated damages based on the number of days 
exceeding the limit, and ALDOT withheld around $600,000 in liquidated damages. Since the 
action was a writ of mandamus to compel a lower court to dismiss, the standard of review was 
whether Good Hope may possibly prevail while construing all doubts regarding the sufficiency 
of the complaint in favor of Good Hope.    
Harbert Case 
Harbert International (Harbert) was awarded two contracts by the Alabama Department of 
Transportation (ALDOT) to replace the Cochrane Bridge over the Mobile River (28). The 
liquidated damages amount for delayed completion was $4000 total per day for both contracts. 
The amount assessed was $534,000 for completion beyond the August, 1991, timeframe. Though 
the standard of review was not stated explicitly, the court appears to have made a de novo 
review.  
Vrana Case 
The Department of Roads in Nebraska (DOR) had contracted with Vrana & Son (Vrana) to 
reconstruct a road and two bridges (29). The contract specified a duration of 412 days, a 
liquidated damages amount of $875 per day and incentive/disincentive clauses. The incentive 
rate was $4700 per day to a maximum of $9400, and the disincentive rate was $4700 per day 
with no maximum. The scope of review was for the appellate court to reach a conclusion 
independent from the lower court. The appellate court found that it did not have jurisdiction to 
rule on the substance of the case since the lower court only granted a partial summary judgment 
and not an appealable final order.  
Anjo Case 
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) contracted with Anjo Construction 
(Anjo) to rehabilitate the Highland Park Bridge in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (30). This bridge was 
the second busiest bridge in Pittsburgh. For the floor beam replacements phase, there was an 
incentive of $43,000 per weekend up to a maximum of six. For bridge closures, there was an 
incentive of $14,350 per day up to 100 days. Due to omissions and errors by the outside 
engineering firm, the project was extended by 64 days on June 4, 1987. Thus the completion date 
was moved to March 18, 1988 but the incentive payment date for opening the bridge to traffic 
was kept at December 9, 1987. Anjo completed the project by December 9, 1987 and received 
the full incentive payment. But Anjo claimed it was entitled to more payments due to 
acceleration among other issues.  
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9.3. DISCUSSION OF LEGAL ISSUES 
Enforceability 
The first and perhaps the most important issue concerning I/D contracts is the enforceability of 
such contracts. The comments to the proposed rulemaking to § 630.305 in 1987 foreshadowed 
the enforceability issues that arose in later court cases. One commentator expressed concern over 
the separation of the CE and delay-related costs that might “jeopardize the enforceability of the 
liquidated damages provision.” (5) Courts have recognized the right of freedom of contract and 
are adverse to holding contracts unenforceable unless they are illegal or they clearly violate the 
public policy of the state (31). One such violation of public policy occurs when a contract 
provision is construed as a penalty. There are several examples where contractors have sought to 
invalidate disincentive or liquidated damages clauses on such a theory. In Good Hope and in 
Harbert, the contractor sought to invalidate the liquidated damages provision as an unlawful 
penalty.  In Vrana and in Milton I, the disincentive provisions were ruled to be penalties and 
unenforceable. Furthermore, the issue of enforceability is a matter of law that is decided by the 
judge. The Vrana court granted a partial summary judgment on this basis. The Alabama Supreme 
Court in Milton I invalidated the disincentive clause instead of remanding even though the appeal 
was of the lower court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of ALDOT. Summary judgment 
means that there is no genuine issue of fact to be decided by a jury in jury cases.     
As explained in Williston, the determination for when a clause is treated as a penalty is not a 
clear line (32). But courts do look at whether breach damages are reasonably susceptible to be 
measured by some adequate and approved legal standard. The Milton I (2010) court discussed 
the typical criteria for deciding if an amount should be characterized as a penalty. They are: 1) 
the breach injury must be difficult to accurately estimate ahead of time, 2) the parties must intend 
for the amount to be for damages and not penalties, and 3) the amount must be a reasonable 
estimate of damages. The language used in I/D or liquidated damages clauses is not dispositive 
in construing such clauses as non-penalty. Thus courts will disregard self-serving language and 
look beyond the label that was applied in the contract clauses to the actions of the parties (16).  
Regarding the second criterion, the Milton I court held that ALDOT unilaterally decided to 
include a disincentive clause prior to any negotiations with Milton. This ruling appears to be 
problematic in light of typical agency contracting and bidding procedures through which 
contracts are awarded. Perhaps, this would suggest that the use of A+B bidding with I/D 
contracts might be considered less unilateral, since the bidder submits the cost and time for 
completion. On Criterion 3, the Milton I court stated that ALDOT conceded that it arbitrarily set 
the dollar amount of the per-day assessment and the maximum time limit for the assessment in 
the disincentive clause. It is therefore important for agencies to document their basis for 
disincentive and liquidated damages amounts and time limits. One commentator also 
recommends the documentation of negotiations with contractors as to the amount of liquidated 
damages (16), but such negotiations are not typical in public highway construction.   
Taking a different approach than the use of I/D clauses, one possible suggestion from this 
chapter is to discard disincentives in favor of including all the categories of damages in the 
liquidated damages clause. Thus liquidated damages would include all potential types of 
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damages including engineering costs, construction costs, administration costs, road user delays 
and safety impacts. One major reason for this suggestion is the danger of having performance 
acceleration construed as a penalty. The Milton I court cited Williston (32) to show that a 
provision included to stimulate performance was unenforceable. The court emphasized contract 
language that stated it was “in the public’s interest to complete this project at the earliest possible 
date”, thus the disincentive clause acted as a discouragement or penalty for late completion. The 
disincentive clause was construed as a security for contract performance via financial 
punishment and not as compensation for public delays. The Milton I court differentiated 
disincentives from liquidated damages by saying one was designed to punish a party who 
breaches while the other was an amount paid in lieu of performance. It is arguable whether 
project acceleration and damage compensation are that different from each other. In the field of 
transportation, there is significant research documenting the relationship between work zone 
duration and traffic impacts for both safety and mobility. From a practical standpoint, an 
additional day of construction necessarily means that more delay and safety damages result, 
though the magnitude of impacts varies from location to location. However, the Milton I court 
seems to say performance acceleration and damage minimization are categorically different. It 
appears that the court is treating the disincentive phase of a contract as performance and not 
breach.  
Another reason for eliminating disincentives is the potential for liquidated damages and 
disincentives to overlap. As seem in Milton I and II, any double inclusion of damages in multiple 
contract clauses could render one clause as redundant and unenforceable. The Milton II court 
stated that since the liquidated damages clause accounted for delays, there could be no recovery 
for the road user costs in disincentives. The court described the double recovery as passing “the 
limit of reasonableness”. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 635.127 (c) states, “The STD 
[state department of transportation] may, with FHWA concurrence, include additional amounts 
as liquidated damages in each contract to cover other anticipated costs of project related delays 
or inconveniences to the STD or the public … road user delay costs may be include.” (7) The 
Federal Register explained that FHWA recognizes liquidated damages to include not only CE 
costs but other project delay-related costs (5). In § 635.102, the definition for I/D for early 
completion includes “estimates of such items as traffic safety, traffic maintenance, and road user 
delay costs.” (1) Thus delay-related costs could be included in both liquidated damages and 
disincentives, and that double inclusion could make disincentives a subset of liquidated damages.  
A third reason for discarding disincentives is that incentives and disincentives are not symmetric 
in terms of their legal underpinning. Unlike disincentives, incentives cannot be considered a 
penalty and be ruled unenforceable. But incentive clauses have their own issues in that they 
might be labeled as gifts or bonuses which might violate public contracting laws. It then appears 
that incentives and disincentives have different enforceability concerns. This theoretical 
asymmetry is also supported by empirical data. According to Gao (33) incentives are applied 
much more often than disincentives. For example for 32 Kentucky projects, $10,868,395 was 
paid in incentives while only $21,500 was paid in disincentives for a ratio of 506 to 1. Two 
possible explanations are contractors’ desires to maximize earnings and DOTs setting overly 
conservative completion dates. Unfortunately it is difficult to know the exact reasons as actual 
acceleration costs and profits are not disclosed by contractors. Despite this fact, the empirical 
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asymmetry supports the notion that the legal basis behind incentives and disincentives are quite 
different.  
The proposed approach is the opposite of CFR’s approach in promoting the use of I/D.  CFR 
explains that I/D provisions are intended for use on those critical projects where traffic impacts 
should be minimized (4). By reserving I/D for higher traffic impact projects, there is an emphasis 
that these kinds of impacts might be unusual and merit closer scrutiny. In contrast, the proposed 
approach is to let the liquidated damages amount speak for itself. On the higher traffic impact 
projects, the RUC amounts will naturally be higher. And on projects where traffic demands are 
under the work-zone or detour route capacities, then the liquidated damages amount will be 
commensurate with zero RUC cost. This approach tries to justify all types of damages directly on 
the basis of liquidated damages. In contrast, the I/D approach could end up with two related legal 
hurdles instead of one: to prove that disincentives are liquidated damages and to establish that 
the liquidated damages are not penalties.  
Other I/D Legal Issues 
If a court determines that an agency ordered the acceleration of a contract beyond what was 
specified in the original contract, then the contractor may recover for costs incurred for 
accelerating project performance. The opposite could also occur, where an agency excuses the 
contractor for delays. The more unique situation is when an agency expressed no specific 
commands and yet is held to have constructively ordered the contractor to accelerate. The Anjo 
court states that such a case could exist when an agency asks a contractor to accelerate or merely 
expresses concern about the lagging process (30). In Anjo, the project was delayed because of 
design and other errors beyond the contractor’s control. The performance date was extended but 
not the incentive payment date. But instead of treating the tardiness as an excusable delay, the 
court ruled that there was constructive acceleration so that the contractor should receive the 
maximum incentive payment. The court reasoned that the contractor accelerated the work to 
meet project deadlines and not to earn the incentive payment. The support for its decision was 
that the contractor’s increase in labor costs was greater than the maximum incentive payment. It 
is surprising that the court made an economic argument based on the difference between the 
increased actual labor cost and the incentive payment during the time of performance. Despite 
the problematic economic justification, Anjo cautions against the owner treating the completion 
and incentive dates as different.  
Constructive suspension is a delay order that is inferred from the actions of an agency that causes 
a delay. In Bonacorso, the contractor asked the court to adopt the principle of constructive 
suspension to recover damages such as idle equipment, labor rate escalations and home office 
overhead (26). The court ruled that the exchanges between the contractor and the agency were 
deficient as an order because it did not accurately describe the number of delay days ordered thus 
there was no reasonable basis for accurately estimating delay damages.   
Though not unique to contract acceleration cases, the role of sovereign immunity has appeared in 
many I/D cases. Sovereign immunity means a state and its agencies have absolute immunity 
from suit in any court. Some exceptions to this doctrine include actions to compel a state official 
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to perform his/her duties and declaratory judgments. A requirement in such actions is that the 
proper state official in his/her representative capacity must be included as a named defendant. 
For example in Milton II, the court affirmed the validity of suits that named the proper state 
office in his/her representative capacity (20). But in Good Hope, the case was thrown out 
because the agency, ALDOT, was named and not the director of the agency (27). In both Milton 
and Harbert, the courts held that the exception to compel a state official to perform his/her duties 
was met (20) (28). The courts explained that once the highway departments had legally 
contracted under state law for services and accepted the services, then the obligation to pay was 
not subject to sovereign immunity. In Milton, the court ruled that the disincentive clause was 
unenforceable as penalty. In Harbert, even though the court allowed the suit to go forward, the 
court ultimately ruled for the agency holding that the damages against the state are an 
unconstitutional divestment of state treasury funds. The contractor had sought un-liquidated 
damages for the agency’s failure to consider another scheduling sequence and for extra work 
performed.    
In Good Hope, the court considered the contractor’s argument that ALDOT could be sued 
because of the declaratory judgment exception (27). The contractor asked the court to invalid the 
liquidated-damages clause as an unenforceable penalty. However, the court characterized the 
case as nothing more than action for damages. The court explained that the exception applied 
only when the action seeks no relief other than the construction of a statute and how it should be 
applied in a given situation. Likewise in River Road, the court distinguished the case from Milton 
and characterized the claim for unanticipated expenses as an action for damages and not a 
declaratory action (25).  
In Ray Bell, the court considered the parol evidence rule which affected the admissibility of 
external evidence in interpreting the incentive/disincentive contract (23). Under this rule, an 
ambiguous contract could be interpreted using extrinsic evidence. The court held that the plain 
language of the contract, including the incentive/disincentive provisions, was unambiguous thus  
the contractor was not entitled to use extrinsic evidence to prove the incentive payment date was 
changed contrary to the contract language. Ray Bell also discussed the Critical Path Method 
(CPM) for construction scheduling and its importance in incentive/disincentive contracts. If a 
delay were to arise, then CPM will help to determine which tasks were critical and dependent 
upon previous tasks.  
9.4. SUMMARY 
In light of the legal issues that have surfaced in Milton I and II as well as in other I/D cases, the 
following agency best practices are suggested. The most significant recommendation is to 
discard disincentives in favor of including all damages as liquidated damages including road user 
costs (RUC). This approach would prevent disincentive clauses from being construed as mere 
performance acceleration thus unenforceable as a penalty. This will also avoid specifying 
overlapping RUC damages in both the liquidated damages and in the disincentive provisions. 
Furthermore, incentives and disincentives have different enforceability issues. The former could 
be construed as unenforceable penalties, while the latter as illegal gifts or bonuses. If indeed I/D 
is rooted in the foundation of liquidated damages, then a deviation in language could forfeit such 
a bedrock.  
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The authors are aware that DOTs need to carefully balance many issues beyond just legal issues. 
One issue that motivated the historical use of disincentives is the promotion of public 
understanding and acceptance of incentives. Those who advocate for the symmetry in 
incentive/disincentives contracts suggest that this symmetry helps to justify the use of incentives 
to the public. But could not incentives coupled with liquidated damages serve the same purpose 
as I/D?  
It is important for agencies to document their basis for the disincentive and liquidated damages 
amounts and time limits. This documentation helps an agency to establish that damages are 
difficult to accurately estimate ahead of time and that the amount specified in liquidated damages 
is reasonable. The communication of the basis for liquidated damages to contractors could also 
help to establish that both parties intended for the amount to be damages and not penalties. But 
self-serving language in the contract might not be dispositive in the enforceability determination.  
Agency staff should be careful in what they communicate to contractors concerning project 
acceleration or suspension even if the acceleration was not written in the original contract. 
Courts could apply the theory of constructive acceleration and hold that a contractor was entitled 
to incentive payments even if work was completed beyond the date specified. Thus a court could 
construe communications as actual orders that modify a contract. Similarly, a court could excuse 
a contractor from disincentive payments if they found that an agency constructively approved  
delays.   
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10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Project acceleration has become a national focus. The newly enacted transportation bill, Moving 
Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century, emphasizes accelerated project delivery and innovation 
(FHWA 2012). Innovative contracting techniques such as incentive/disincentive contracting 
could be one tool for ensuring the timely delivery of transportation projects. One previously 
unanswered research question was whether work zone impacts are mitigated using I/D contracts. 
This study reports the results from an examination of completed I/D projects in Missouri from 
2008 to 2011. Data shows that I/D projects reduced both mobility and safety road user costs. The 
average days saved was around 11 days and the average total RUC savings was over $444,000 
per project. Contractors appeared to be aggressive in pursuing incentives and avoiding 
disincentives. No contractors were assessed disincentives while fourteen of the twenty 
contractors obtained the maximum incentive amount. In total, I/D projects saved around $8.9 
million in road user costs while only paying a little less than $1.7 million in incentives. The 
savings corresponded to a reduction of 214 days in construction.  The RUC savings and schedule 
reduction were achieved with an average I/D rate discounted to 16.7% of the daily RUC and a 
maximum incentive of 3.4% of the original contract amount. 
The effectiveness of I/D for various project characteristics was analyzed. Urban projects, full-
closure projects and emergency projects all seemed to be good candidates for I/D provisions. The 
net RUC savings was 80% for urban projects, 86% for full-closure projects, and 93% for 
emergency projects. Rural, non-emergency projects effectively saved RUC but not at the same 
level as other projects, only netting 33% of RUC savings. 
A programmatic evaluation of all MoDOT projects showed that I/D projects deviated more than 
other projects from the programmed costs. However, such deviations (-11.82%) were not 
primarily produced by the I/D payouts since incentive payments only accounted for 2.32% of 
final contract costs. I/D projects were completed on time more often than other projects, which 
indicates that I/D contracts successfully reduce construction time. I/D projects also had a higher 
percentage change of award amounts to final amounts, but this change could be skewed by two 
projects. The concern that I/D contracts could reduce the number of qualified bidders due to 
different contractor’s capabilities and the innovation required did not materialize. In fact, the 
average number of bids per call was higher for I/D than other projects. This is important for a 
competitive market, which could lead to lower award amounts for the DOT. 
The survey of DOT and contractors shows that both are in agreement to the importance of 
various issues to the acceleration of construction. The success of an I/D contract depends on all 
parties understanding what is at stake and how to accomplish the specific goals at hand. These 
goals must be well defined early in process. Constant communication will insure all parties are 
on the same page and any problems will be resolved quickly. 
The existing literature shows the sample size of evaluated I/D projects is limited. This study 
included a larger sample size of twenty I/D projects let by Missouri over a four-year span. The 
results show that I/D contracting is successful at mitigating work zone impacts. Further research 
could compare similar projects that do not include I/D provisions to those in this study. This 
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could help resolve whether or not contractors actually use additional efforts to accelerate 
construction, which would justify using incentives. Comparing to non-I/D projects could also 
reveal how contractors are adjusting their bids in anticipation of incentives or to cover the 
increased risk. 
The following is a list of recommendations based on the research results:  
1) This report documents how I/D contracts are highly effective in mitigating work zone 
impacts such as traveler delays, wasted fuel and safety costs. For every dollar paid in 
incentives for I/D projects in Missouri, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC costs were 
reduced. The programmatic analysis found that the number of contractor bids did not 
decrease for I/D projects, and contractor survey results showed that contractors were 
confident in their ability to accelerate projects. Thus this report recommends for DOTs to 
continue to explore the use of such contracts and perhaps to include the consideration of 
such contracts in their standard contracting process.  
2) This report found that I/D contracts were highly effective for urban, full-closure and 
emergency projects, but were less effective for rural, non-emergency contracts. 
Therefore, this report recommends that DOTs consider the use of I/D contracts for urban, 
full-closure and emergency projects.  
3) Based on the survey findings, this report recommends for DOTs to be mindful of three 
common challenges to I/D contract success: a well-defined project scope, timely problem 
resolution and good communications with contractors.  
4) Based on the legal analysis, this report recommends that DOTs discard disincentives in 
favor of including all damages as liquidated damages including RUC. This approach 
would prevent disincentive clauses from being construed as mere performance 
acceleration thus unenforceable as a penalty. This will also avoid specifying overlapping 
RUC damages in both the liquidated damages and in the disincentive provisions. For an 
example of this approach, see the MoDOT liquidates savings/liquidated damages 
provision shown in Appendix B.   
5) This report recommends that DOTs document their basis for disincentive and liquidated 
damages amounts and time limits. For example, this report used national manuals such as 
the Highway Capacity Manual and the Highway Safety Manual to compute traveler 
delays, fuel expended and safety crash costs. This documentation helps an agency to 
establish that damages are difficult to accurately estimate ahead of time and that the 
amount specified in liquidated damages is reasonable since it is based on real road user 
costs such as delays, fuel expended and safety costs.  
6) DOT staff should be careful in what they communicate to contractors concerning project 
acceleration or suspension. Courts could construe communications as actual orders that 
modify a contract date or excuse a contractor from disincentives.  
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7) For future research, this report recommends that I/D contracts be compared against 
similar projects that do not include an I/D provision to determine whether contractors use 
additional effort to accelerate construction to justify incentives. 
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APPENDIX A. I/D PROJECT DETAILS 
Table A-1 I/D Contract Details 
No. 
Full 
closure? 
Original Contract 
Amount 
Final Contract 
Amount 
Contract 
Time 
Contract Time 
Adjusted 
ID1 Yes $588,464.00 $602,405.80 220 220 
ID2 Yes $3,492,032.80 $4,567,387.89 54 54 
ID3 Yes $2,633,985.63 $3,636,552.66 73 77 
ID4 Yes $3,293,570.90 $2,140,771.99 25 25 
ID5 Yes $1,290,131.07 $1,275,557.33 31 53 
ID6 Yes $2,129,437.87 $2,486,076.83 180 180 
ID7 Yes $2,097,000.00 $2,117,000.00 93 132 
ID8 Yes $483,025.24 $484,719.24 78 78 
ID9 
Intersection 
Access 
$6,795,644.83 $7,193,598.94 260 260 
ID10 Yes $514,588.43 $509,306.58 297 297 
ID11 
Intersection 
Access 
$13,705,018.30 $15,225,280.29 236 236 
ID12 No $2,881,819.99 $2,967,961.19 273 467 
ID13 Yes $574,492.26 $636,622.51 103 103 
ID14 Yes $2,650,395.06 $2,793,745.66 205 205 
ID15 Yes $14,838,238.82 $14,857,563.77 759 759 
ID16 No $559,158.73 $568,194.75 118 118 
ID17 Yes $331,913.90 $346,294.39 40 40 
ID18 
Intersection 
Access 
$104,681.15 $100,621.65 46 46 
ID19 Yes $1,064,668.53 $1,169,251.10 135 135 
ID20 Yes $9,264,133.39 $10,360,309.87 234 834 
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Table A-2 I/D Project Location Details 
No. 
Route 
No 
 
County Location of Work AADT 
Functional 
Classification 
Rural/Urban 
ID1 169 
 
Gentry Island Creek, south of Stanberry 1,970 Minor arterial Rural 
ID2 136 
 
Atchison 
from Co. Rd. C Ave. to e/o Phelps 
City 
1,858 Principal arterial Rural 
ID3 159 
 
Holt 
from west of Rt. 111 to east of Rt. P 
near Fortescue 
1,008 Minor arterial Rural 
ID4 136 
 
Atchison 
from Rte D east to bridge east of 
Phelps City 
1,858 Principal arterial Rural 
ID5 59 
 
Buchanan 
from the Missouri River bridge to 
Route 45 near Winthrop 
9,520 Principal arterial Rural 
ID6 
Delmar 
Blvd 
 
St Louis at I-170 interchange in University City 14,300 Principal urban arterial Urban 
ID7 24 
 
Chariton over Grand River west of Brunswick 1,975 Principal arterial Rural 
ID8 109 
 
St. Louis 
at the Woods Road intersection south 
of Route 100 in Wildwood 
17,191 Urban major collector Urban 
ID9 179 
 
Cole 
Missouri Blvd & Route 179 
intersection in Jefferson City 
35,000 Principal urban arterial Urban 
ID10  B 
 
Warren 
I-70 interchange on southwest outer 
road & Route B 
2,580 Minor arterial Urban 
ID11 I-55 
 
Perry 
in the northbound lanes from Route 61 
to Route B near Fruitland 
9,960 Interstate Rural 
ID12 9 
 Clay/ 
Jackson 
from 10th Avenue to 3rd Street in 
Kansas City 
30,000 Principal urban arterial Urban 
ID13 C 
 
Franklin 
south of City of New Haven at Bouef 
Creek 
486 Major collector Rural 
ID14 136 
 
Harrison 
west of New Hampton to the route 
69/13 intersection in Bethany 
2,560 Principal arterial Rural 
ID15 41 
 Carroll/ 
Saline 
over Missouri River in Miami 1,470 Minor arterial Rural 
ID16 I-70 
 
Montgomery east of route F near High Hill 16,760 Interstate Urban 
ID17 V 
 
Jackson 
from Little Blue Road to Murkins 
Road north aof Route 350 in Kansas 
City 
10,692 Principal arterial Urban 
ID18 100 
 
St. Louis 
Rte. 270 & Marine Avenue and Rte. 
100 & Holloway Road. 
20,283 Major arterial Urban 
ID19 D 
 
New Madrid 
west of North Lilbourn between Route 
MM and Route E 
1,600 Major collector Rural 
ID20 
Noland 
Rd 
 
Jackson over I-70 in Independence 29,500 Principal urban arterial Urban 
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Table A-3 I/D Provision Details 
No. I/D Goal 
Calendar 
Days or 
Completion 
Date 
ID Rate 
Max 
Incentive 
Max  
Incentive 
Days 
Incentive 
Period 
Days 
Actually 
Used 
Days 
Actually 
Saved 
Incentive 
Earned 
ID1 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$2,000 $10,000 5 14 9 5 $10,000 
ID2 
Open to 
traffic 
Completion 
date 
$8,000 $80,000 10 34 19 15 $80,000 
ID3 
Project 
completion 
Completion 
date 
$3,000 $15,000 5 60 60 0 $0 
ID4 
Project 
completion 
Completion 
date 
$10,000 $100,000 10 25 15 10 $100,000 
ID5 Milestone 
Completion 
date 
$12,000 $36,000 3 7 3 4 $36,000 
ID6 
Open to 
traffic 
Completion 
date 
$15,000 $225,000 15 127 112 15 $225,000 
ID7 Milestone 
Completion 
date 
$10,000 $100,000 10 46 44 2 $20,000 
ID8 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$5,000 $70,000 14 42 39 3 $15,000 
ID9 
Open to 
traffic 
Completion 
date 
$10,000 $70,000 7 242 222 20 $70,000 
ID10 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$3,840 $7,680 2 4 4 0 $0 
ID11 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$15,000 $300,000 20 175 155 20 $300,000 
ID12 
Open to 
traffic 
Calendar 
days 
$9,000 $156,000 18 135 114 21 $156,000 
ID13 
Open to 
traffic 
Calendar 
days 
$2,000 $60,000 30 85 53 32 $60,000 
ID14 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$2,000 $10,000 5 12 10 2 $4,000 
ID15 
Open to 
traffic 
Calendar 
days 
$7,000 $504,000 72 365 365 0 $0 
ID16 
Open to 
traffic 
Calendar 
days 
$15,000 $25,000 1.67 17 11.4 5.6 $25,000 
ID17 
Project 
completion 
Completion 
date 
$5,000 $25,000 5 23 9 14 $25,000 
ID18 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$2,000 $10,000 5 14 9 5 $10,000 
ID19 
Open to 
traffic 
Completion 
date 
$13,000 $100,000 8 117 109 8 $100,000 
ID20 Milestone 
Calendar 
days 
$14,000 $448,000 32 90 58 32 $448,000 
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APPENDIX B. MODOT I/D JOB SPECIAL PROVISION (JSP) 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES / LIQUIDATED SAVINGS SPECIFIED JSP-03-05 
1.0  Description.  If construction of (description of the work), is not completed by (unit of time, hours, 
calendar days, completion date), the Commission, the traveling public, and state and local police and 
governmental authorities will be damaged in various ways, including but not limited to potential liability, 
traffic and traffic flow regulation cost, traffic congestion and motorist delay, with its resulting cost to the 
traveling public. 
2.0  Liquidated Damages Specified for Failure To Complete Work on Time.  These costs are not 
reasonably capable of being computed or quantified.  Therefore, the contractor will be charged with 
liquidated damages specified in the amount of (Road User Cost or other justifiable amount) per (time 
frame in appropriate units) for each full (unit of time, hours, days)  that all (description of the work, ex. All 
contract work shall be completed as directed in the contract and on the plans including guardrail and 
open to traffic.)), in excess of the limitation as specified elsewhere in the special provision.  It will be the 
responsibility of the engineer to determine the quantity of excess closure time. 
2.1  The said liquidated damages specified will be assessed in addition to any other liquidated damages 
charged under the Missouri Standard Specifications for Highway Construction, as indicated elsewhere in 
this contract.  
2.2  This deduction will continue until such time as the necessary work is completed and traffic is 
restored. 
3.0  Liquidated Savings Specified for Early Completion.  The contractor may receive an incentive 
payment from the Commission, in addition to all other sums earned under the contract, if the contractor 
completes (description of the work).  To qualify for this incentive payment, (description of the work) must 
be completed.   (ex. All contract work shall be completed as directed in the contract and on the plans 
including guardrail and open to traffic.)  An incentive payment of (RUC or other justifiable amount) will be 
paid per (unit of time, hours, days) for each full (unit of time, hours, days) that the work described above 
is completed prior to (time frame in appropriate units).  The maximum amount paid as liquidated savings 
will not exceed (XX% or $XXX,XXX to be determined on a project by project basis, does not usually 
exceed 10%) of the total bid for Job No.  Jxxxxxxx.   
3.1  In the event of an excusable delay, an extension of the contract completion time will not extend the 
date specified for determining any liquidated savings or incentive. Further, in the event of an excusable 
delay, if the contractor completes the work providing for liquidated savings or incentive on or before the 
milestone or other date, that shall not constitute a basis to claim acceleration costs in addition to the 
liquidated savings or incentive that may be earned. 
3.2  The incentive payment described above is made, not as a bonus or gift, but as stipulated 
compensation in full for reduced risks, delay and inconvenience experienced by the traveling public, and 
for other reduced costs to the Commission and public resulting from early completion. 
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APPENDIX C. SELECT SURVEY QUESTIONS  
The DOT and contractor surveys were designed and implemented using the web-based Survey 
Monkey tool. Skip logic was implemented meaning subsequent questions could be skipped 
depending on the preceding responses.  Some of the following questions did not apply to 
contractors.  
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